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Market power and long-term gas contracts: the case of Gazprom in 
Central and Eastern European Gas Markets 
 
Chi Kong Chyong, David M Reiner and Dhruvak Aggarwal*** 
 
Abstract 
We explore a major European competition decision, the 2012-18 Gazprom case, using a 
global gas market simulation model. We find that access to LNG markets alone is insufficient 
to counterbalance Gazprom’s strategic behaviour; central and eastern Europe (CEE) needs to 
be well interconnected with bidirectional flow capability.  ‘Swap deals’ created by the decision 
facilitate CEE market integration, while limiting Gazprom’s potential market power. Such 
deals may increase the diversity of contracted gas and number of market players, but do not 
improve physical supply diversity. In the next five years, swap deals could marginally impact 
negatively the utilization of strategic assets in CEE, but since Gazprom’s commitments expire 
by mid-2026, utilization of these strategic assets may fall considerably, especially if Gazprom 
withholds supplies. As an unintended consequence, CEE markets may disintegrate from the 
rest of Europe. Avoiding such outcomes will require further gas market reforms, particularly, 
market design for gas transportation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Healthy energy markets hinge on effective competition rules and, critically, on how those 
rules are implemented.  From the early 2000s onwards, the Directorate-General for 
Competition (DG COMP) of the European Commission (EC) has emphasised competitiveness 
in European gas and electricity markets. Its antitrust investigations have spanned merger cases, 
like the 2006 GDF-Suez merger and the 2008 EdF-British Energy merger, as well as 
investigations into long-term contracts (LTCs) for gas supply with major exporting countries, 
namely Russia, Norway and Algeria (see Note 1 in Supplementary Information (SI) for a 
detailed history of LTCs).  
In 2009, the EU adopted the Third Energy Package, which sought to implement new 
policies to open markets and accelerate investment such as ownership unbundling and 
independent system operators. Under this new regime, Lithuania filed a complaint against the 
Russian state-owned gas exporter, Gazprom, for using its monopoly position to charge high 
gas prices in the Lithuanian market through specific clauses in its LTCs. The EC subsequently 
carried out ‘dawn raids’ on Gazprom offices in ten Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Member 
States (MS) in September 2011. After finding evidence of anticompetitive behaviour on the 
part of Gazprom, in September 2012, DG COMP announced it had opened proceedings into 
contracts between Gazprom and eight CEE MS: Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia 
(EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL) and Slovakia (SK). In April 
2015, the Commission adopted a ‘statement of objections’ (SO), describing its preliminary 
assessment of the case (EC, 2015). Gazprom was accused of: 
a. Imposing LTC restrictions on customers in the eight CEE MS, restricting exports and 
usage of gas to certain territories, and refusing to change delivery points for their gas 
imports;  
b. Pursuing unfair pricing policy in five MS - Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland (henceforth MS5); and 
c. Obtaining unrelated commitments from its contractual counterparties concerning gas 
transport infrastructure (in Poland, the Yamal-Europe pipeline and in Bulgaria, the 
South Stream pipeline). 
In February 2017, Gazprom proposed commitments to address the EC’s objections. In 
response, the EC subjected these proposed commitments to a market test, following which 
Gazprom revised its proposed commitments in March 2018. Although the Polish state oil and 
gas company PGNiG filed a complaint with the EC against Gazprom following the initial 
proposal, it was rejected on grounds that the commitments already addressed the allegations 
made in the complaint, which mirror the EC’s own concerns. The revised commitments, 
effective until mid-2026, were made legally binding on Gazprom in an Article 9 ‘commitments 
decision’ passed on 24 May 2018 (EC, 2018). PGNiG subsequently appealed to the European 
Court of Justice on 16 October 2018 (Euractiv, 2018). In February 2019, the appeal was joined 
by the Polish and Lithuanian governments (Polandin, 2019), as well as the Bulgarian gas 
company Overgas (PGNiG, 2019). 
We develop a bespoke modelling framework to offer new insights into European antitrust 
investigations in upstream gas markets over the past two decades and explore possible 
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consequences. Our research contributes to the energy economics literature in several ways. 
Although there have been several studies on the state of EU gas markets focusing on Russian 
exports (Aune et al, 2017), supply disturbances (Bartelet and Mulder, 2020), projects of 
common interest (PCIs) for gas infrastructure (Kiss et al 2016), and optimal deployment of gas 
(Fodstad et al 2016), there have been no publicly-available studies analysing the future of gas 
markets in this new landscape.  
We examine the impacts of Gazprom’s 2018 settlement of the case on future gas markets 
in Europe using a large-scale computational model. The model builds on Chyong and Hobbs 
(2014) but incorporates a number of significant extensions.  The model now explicitly 
represents Former Soviet Union (FSU) and individual CEE states in a global gas market and 
captures the significant changes in European gas infrastructure including those anticipated for 
the 2020s. Further, the model adds an important feature of the gas market – swap transactions 
proposed by Gazprom as part of its commitments; swap transactions are related to well-
established ‘backhaul’ transactions in the gas industry, which were explicitly modelled by Kiss 
et al. (2016). On the policy side, the analysis adds to existing ex ante modelling studies by 
investigating the impacts of implementing Gazprom’s commitments on gas markets in CEE 
and North-Western Europe1 (NWE) along three dimensions: 
i. Delivery points. Under what circumstances, if any, does the possibility of changing 
delivery points (or ‘swap deals’) for Russian gas within CEE markets improve the 
welfare and market efficiency of MS5? 
ii. Product market definition. How effective are swap deals in constraining the potential 
market power of Gazprom in MS5 vis-à-vis diversifying gas infrastructure?   
iii. Geographic market definition. What is the possible impact of swap deals on the 
wholesale prices of other markets and how geographically ‘wide’ would those impacts 
be? This is important, as any changes to the service charges for swap deals could affect 
market prices beyond those markets directly affected by swap deals. 
EU competition cases play a critical role in the evolution of European gas (and electricity) 
markets (SI Note 2) and yet there have been no detailed analyses of any major competition 
decision in the public domain. We explore one of the most important recent decisions, the 
2012-18 Gazprom antitrust case, using a global gas market simulation model. The rest of this 
paper is organised as follows: §2 provides an overview of relevant gas market modelling 
studies; §3 describes the methodology used to assess and quantify the impacts of Gazprom’s 






1 Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; these markets make up the TTF gas hub, the most liquid gas 
trading hub in Europe. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Energy market models have been used by firms and governments to study both ex post and 
ex ante impacts of energy policy and regulatory decisions, or to examine macroeconomic 
development pathways and competition analysis (Herbst et al. 2012; Davies 2010). 
Competition authorities use ex post statistical analysis to prioritise policy interventions based 
on past effectiveness and to help justify their decisions (Ilzkovitz and Dierx (2015) provide a 
detailed review). Chauve and Godfried (2007) present DG COMP’s ex post electricity market 
simulation and withholding analysis2 as part of the 2005 Sector Inquiry and find a positive 
correlation between market concentration and wholesale electricity price mark-ups. Further, 
Argentesi et al. (2017) provide the only independent quantitative ex post assessment of a DG 
COMP case, using a Difference-in-Differences method to assess actual market conditions and 
the counterfactual after the 2006 GdF-Suez merger. They conclude that the unbundling 
required in the settlement increased competition in the Belgian gas market and reduced prices. 
The ex ante quantitative analyses used by DG COMP to inform its antitrust and merger 
decisions are not publicly available. Budzinski and Ruhmer (2009) provide a review of the 
merger simulation models (MSM) employed in competition policy, noting that MSM is still a 
novel instrument for ex ante antitrust analysis and hence remains underexploited. The authors 
classify MSMs and summarise their usage in mergers cases, concluding that MSMs must be 
combined with traditional competition policy instruments. Further, Ilzkovitz and Dierx (2015) 
mention that a simple version of the Proportionally Calibrated Almost Ideal Demand System 
(PCAIDS3) model (Coloma 2006) has been used for pre-merger impact evaluations. 
In 2003, the Dutch competition authority commissioned ECN and Frontier Economics to 
develop two electricity market simulation models to assess ex ante the merger between two 
leading utilities Nuon and Reliant (Budzinski and Ruhmer, 2009). The competition authority’s 
decision was subsequently challenged by Nuon and NERA (2005) was asked to reconstruct the 
ECN/Frontier Economics models. Other examples of energy MSMs employed for ex ante 
quantitative analysis to support competition policy are rare, as noted by Budzinski and Ruhmer 
(2009). Wolak (2011) uses a Cournot competition model to study potential post-merger effects 
in the Maryland electricity market using a withholding analysis and finds potential post-merger 
price increases. 
Budzinski and Ruhmer (2009) classify MSMs based on two key assumptions: the form of 
competition and the functional form of systems of demand used to develop MSMs. Bertrand 
models, Cournot and supply function models, and auction models are three forms of 
competition most often used to develop MSMs. Froeb and Werden (2008) noted there is a 
widespread consensus that Bertrand models are appropriate for oligopolies in heterogenous 
product markets while Cournot models are more appropriate for oligopolies in homogenous 
 
2 The withholding analysis is a flipside of the SSNIP (Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in the 
Price) test which seeks to define the smallest relevant market for which a firm hypothetical monopolist could 
profitably impose a hypothetical small (typically 5-10%), permanent price increase (see Commission Notice OJ 
C 372, 9/12/1997). On withholding ranalysis to detect market power in electricity markets see Patton et al. 
(2002); Joskow and Kahn (2002). 
3 PCAIDS is one model of demand used to calculate cross-price and own-price elasticities for pre-merger 
analysis (Budzinski and Ruhmer, 2009). 
 5 
product markets (e.g, commodities like crude oil, gas, electricity etc.) (Budzinski and Ruhmer, 
2009). 
Indeed, academic gas market models represent oligopolistic market structure by Cournot 
model (e.g., Abada et al., 2013; Chyong and Hobbs, 2014; Egging et al., 2009; Gabriel et al., 
2012, 2013; Growitsch et al., 2014; Holz et al., 2008; Holz et al., 2017; Huppmann and Egging, 
2014; Lise and Hobbs, 2009; Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2017). These models have been extensively 
used for policy assessments and energy security analyses but large-scale, Cournot-based gas 
market simulation models are rarely applied to competition policy assessments. Only a handful 
of studies quantified the impacts of flexibility in global LNG markets using various methods 
(e.g., real options, econometrics and simulation approaches: Rodríguez, 2008; Barbe and Riker, 
2015; Shi and Variam, 2016) but not large-scale Cournot-type gas market models applied to 
important competition cases.  
Our contribution to the energy modelling and policy analysis literature is therefore 
twofold: 
• we update our European gas model (Chyong and Hobbs, 2014) to a global one and 
include explicit modelling of the swap transactions proposed by Gazprom; to our best 
knowledge, apart from Kiss et al. (2016), no publicly available European gas model 
explicitly includes backhaul trades; and 
• we conduct a quantitative assessment of the 2012-18 Gazprom DG COMP antitrust 
case, an important policy development in European gas markets.  
We should note that our approach could be applied not just to natural gas markets but to 
other energy commodity markets – notably coal, oil, and electricity supply. In particular, the 
improvements in modelling backhaul transactions and novel treatment of swap trades should 
be applicable to any homogenous commodity markets where territorial restrictions and long-
term contractual rigidities are common. 
Our updated gas model explicitly represents Former Soviet Union (FSU) and CEE 
countries, with a detailed downstream market representation as well as representation of 
strategic interactions between major global sellers into Europe. Thus, our model allows for 
‘controlled’ experiments or ‘what-if’ analyses, similar to a withholding analysis or SSNIP test. 
The handful of previous studies on FSU and CEE gas markets have largely focussed on security 
of supply (Sagen and Tsygankova, 2008; Morbee and Proost, 2010; Noel et al., 2013) or on 
decisions related to strategic investments between Russia and transit countries (Hubert and 
Suleymanova, 2008; Hubert and Ikonnikova, 2011), and have ignored both detailed 




3.1. Gas swaps and market power scenarios 
Based on the detailed model formulation presented in SI Note 3, this section outlines the 
scenarios we will examine. To illustrate our approach, first let us consider a very simple 
network of four nodes (Figure 1). We can think of MS5 as node 4 while NWE and the rest of 
Europe are node 2, node 3 is Russia/Gazprom while node 1 is all other supplies into Europe. 
We assume that gas is produced in nodes 1 and 3 and transported to nodes 2 and 4 to 
satisfy final consumption 𝑑2 and 𝑑4.  Let sij describe supplies from i={1,3} to j={2,4}, 𝑡𝑗𝑖 be 
the associated transport costs and 𝑐𝑖 the constant marginal cost of production at i. There are 
three unidirectional arcs ij={12,32,34} such that gas can be physically supplied to node 2 
from nodes 1 and 3 while only node 3 supplies node 4. To be clear, in our example there is no 
physical link between either 1 and 4 or 2 and 4, hence, supplies at node 1 or 2 cannot 
physically reach node 4. The dashed red line connecting nodes 2 and 4 represents potential 
swap flows (𝑥24). 
 
Figure 1: a simple natural gas network setup 
Scenario A – competitive benchmark 
Under competitive market assumptions and following the first order conditions (FOC) of 
our maximization problem (SI Note A.3.1), we get optimal sales for node 2: 
0 ≤ 𝑠12 ⊥ (𝑎2 − 𝑏2(𝑠12 + 𝑠32) − (𝑐1 + 𝑡12)) ≤ 0 (1) 
where ⊥ is orthogonality to compactly state the following:  
0 ≤ 𝑠12, (𝑎2 − 𝑏2(𝑠12 + 𝑠32) − (𝑐1 + 𝑡12)) ≤ 0, 𝑠12(𝑎2 − 𝑏2(𝑠12 + 𝑠32) − (𝑐1 + 𝑡12)) = 0 
Let us assume 𝑐1 > 𝑐3 and therefore without capacity limits supplies from node 3 would meet 
the whole market demand in node 2, d2. Thus, let us consider that supplies from node 3 is 
limited by annual long-term contract volume K32. Therefore, the rest of the demand at node 2 
is satisfied by supplies from node 1, which, following eq. 1, would be:  
𝑠12
∗ =




Hence, equilibrium price at node 2 is set by the marginal cost of supplies from node 1 or: 
𝑝2
∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑡12 (3) 









∗ = 𝑐3 + 𝑡34 (4) 
It is easy to see (by comparing equations 3 and 4) that under perfectly competitive market 
conditions, any price differentials between the two markets are due to differences in marginal 
costs of production at node 1 and 3 as well as transport costs to bring gas from these nodes to 
the markets. 
Scenario B1 – supplier 3 exercise market power in node 4 
However, if the dominant supplier in node 4 limits supplies to raise prices at node 4 then 
profit maximising FOC for supplier 3 in node 4 would be: 
0 ≤ 𝑠34 ⊥ (𝑎4 − 2𝑏4𝑠34 − (𝑐3 + 𝑡34)) ≤ 0 (5) 
with optimal supply being 
𝑠34
∗ =




and hence market equilibrium price under the monopoly case at node 4 will be: 
𝑝4
∗ =




Scenario B2 – supplier 2 competes with supplier 3 in node 4 using swaps 
(backhauls) 
Let us consider that supplier 2 can enter the market at node 4 by switching the delivery 
of some contracted gas from node 2 to node 4 while the same setup (as in Scenario B1) holds 
for supplier 3. In the gas industry, this type of transaction (swaps) are similar to well-
established backhaul transactions, which results in the transportation of gas in a direction 
opposite of the aggregate physical flow of gas in the pipeline.  This reversal is achieved by 
redelivering gas at a point(s) upstream from the point(s) of receipt – in our case, from node 2 
to node 4. Obviously, a backhaul trade can only take place when the aggregate backhaul 
transactions equal less than the aggregate forward haul transactions (𝑥24 ≤ 𝐾32) and can 
result in a delivery by reduction of physical flow at a delivery point. This is in essence what 
Gazprom offered to address DG COMP’s concerns.  
If 𝑥24 is gas volume diverted from node 2 to node 4 (backhaul) then its opportunity cost 
in node 4 is the equilibrium market price at node 2, i.e., 𝑝2
∗ and swap service fee 𝑡24. Thus, if 
total contracted volume K32 is sufficient to cover demand at node 4, d4, then the market 
equilibrium solution for node 4 should satisfy the following set of FOCs: 
0 ≤ 𝑠34 ⊥ (𝑎4 − 2𝑏4𝑠34 − (𝑐3 + 𝑡34) − 𝑏4𝑥24) ≤ 0 (8) 
0 ≤ 𝑥24 ⊥ (𝑎4 − 𝑏4(𝑠34 + 𝑥24) − (𝑝2
∗ + 𝑡24)) ≤ 0 (9) 















Hence, the market equilibrium price in node 4 will be: 
𝑝4
∗ = 𝑝2
∗ + 𝑡24 = 𝑐1 + 𝑡12 + 𝑡24 (12) 
Since the market at node 2 is perfectly competitive then it follows from (12) that the 
market at node 4 is also perfectly competitive despite the fact that the dominant supplier 3 is 
a Cournot (monopolist) supplier. This is not surprising given our assumption that 𝑥24 ≤
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𝐾32 > 𝑑4 meaning that the swap volume from node 2 is enough to cover the entire demand at 
node 4 and under social welfare maximization competitive gas supplies from node 2 takes up 
the entire market at node 4. An interesting case is when 𝑥24 ≤ 𝐾32 < 𝑑4 and hence supplier 3 
can still exercise market power on the residual demand (𝑑4 − 𝑥24
∗ ). At another extreme 
where 𝑥24 ≤ 𝐾32 = 0, the equilibrium in both markets 2 and 4 reverts to the results obtained 
in Scenario B1. Thus, as we might expect, the ability to exercise market power is a function 
of access to markets via pipelines and global LNG but also the commercial and institutional 
setup of the markets (allowing swaps and backhaul trade to minimise contractual rigidities 
and hence market foreclosure). 
Therefore, whether Gazprom’s proposed gas swaps and backhaul improves market 
efficiency is an empirical question requiring a global gas market model that can account for 
interlinkages between regional and global supply and demand. Our simulation analysis 
proceeds as follows. First, using the model, we establish a competitive benchmark where all 
gas supplies into Europe and other markets are priced according to their short-run marginal 
costs (Scenario A, §4.1). Then, we quantify if Gazprom’s hypothetical monopolistic 
behaviour in MS5 (Scenario B1) would increase its profit relative to the established 
competitive benchmark case (comparing Scenario B1 with Scenario A). Next, we examine if 
the remedies – Gazprom’s proposed swap deals – would limit and constrain its market power 
MS5 (§4.2). We do so by comparing expected MS5 prices for Scenarios B2, B1 and A. 
Finally, we conduct sensitivity analyses, focusing particularly on the impact of swap deals on 
gas diversification infrastructure in MS5 (§4.3). 
 
3.2. Gas market scenarios 
The findings of the previous section highlight the importance of having competitive 
LNG supply in MS5 for swap flows to be efficient in constraining Gazprom’s market power. 
Availability of competitive LNG supplies inter alia depends on global demand and supply 
assumptions. Thus, to test the robustness of our results, we simulate three IEA global demand 
and supply scenarios from 2021 to 2026: (i) short-term outlook (STO) for global gas markets 
(IEA, 2020a), (ii) Stated Policy Scenario (SPS), and (iii) Sustainable Policy Scenario (SDS) 
both from its 2020 World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2020b). For details, see SI Note 3. In §4 
below, we present our analyses based on the STO while the results from the other two 
scenarios (SPS and SDS) are reported in SI Note 3. These other two market scenarios (SPS 
and SDS) produce similar results to STO, therefore, our conclusions are robust against a 
range of plausible gas market scenarios through 2026. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Can Gazprom profitably raise prices in MS5? 
Our modelling results suggest that Gazprom’s profit under the market power assumption 
(Scenario B1) is ca. 2.80% (or ca. $920 mn p.a. between 2021-26) larger than its profit under 
the competitive benchmark, which suggests it would be profitable for Gazprom to limit 
supplies to MS5. This finding is robust against modelled variations in global market scenarios: 
under SPS (SDS) Gazprom’s profit is 3.57% (8.30%) higher than under the competitive 
benchmark (Table A.5, SI Note 4). 
 Further, simulated wholesale gas prices in Bulgaria, Estonia and Poland are, on average, 
higher than the average competitive prices in NWE markets (Table 1). Gazprom could 
profitably raise prices in Bulgaria by 224% relative to the TTF price under the competitive 
benchmark case; in Estonia by 31%, in Lithuania and Latvia by 17%, and in Poland by 18%. 
Such a drastic differences in mark-ups over competitive prices is because the Baltic States and 
Poland have two LNG terminals (Klaipeda in Lithuania and Świnoujście in Poland) and they 
are physically interconnected while Bulgaria only has one supplier – Gazprom. 
We find high prices under the market power scenario during winter months (Table A. 8, 
SI Note 4) – in Bulgaria, prices are, on average, 281% higher in Oct-Mar (2021-26) and 230% 
higher in Apr-Sept compared to the simulated TTF prices; in other MS5 we see very marginal 
(ca. 1 p.p.) differences between summer and winter price mark-ups. For Bulgaria, this is not 
surprising because of seasonality of gas demand linked to requirements to heat buildings; thus, 
Gazprom’s monopoly power in Bulgaria exacerbate prices when demand (and willingness to 
pay) is higher. While this price differential patterns are true for winter and summer, we should 
note that the differentials are consistently higher in August than in February. Market power 
exacerbates demand for storage which fills up during the summer months. As for other MS5 
states, again, access to two LNG terminals and relatively high storage capacity limits 
Gazprom’s pricing power in the winter. 
 
Table 1: Simulated wholesale gas prices (% relative to TTF) 




behaviour in MS5 




BG 6.60  158% 13.61  324% 6.40  153% 
EE 3.69  88% 5.49  131% 4.09  98% 
LT 3.79  91% 4.91  117% 4.26  102% 
LV 3.47  83% 4.91  117% 3.88  93% 
PL 4.13  99% 4.98  118% 4.80  115% 
TTF* 4.18  100% 4.20  100% 4.19  100% 
DE, FR, IT** 4.07  97% 4.07  97% 4.07  97% 
Minimum price 
($/mmbtu) 
BG 5.13  191% 5.13  191% 5.13  191% 
EE 2.82  105% 3.65  136% 2.57  96% 
LT 2.86  107% 2.99  112% 2.61  97% 
LV 2.74  102% 3.07  115% 2.45  91% 
PL 2.95  110% 2.98  111% 2.98  111% 
TTF* 2.68  100% 2.68  100% 2.68  100% 




BG 8.42  161% 17.32  331% 8.42  161% 
EE 4.86  93% 6.42  123% 5.15  98% 
LT 6.73  129% 7.16  137% 5.64  108% 
LV 4.28  82% 5.84  112% 4.57  87% 
PL 6.32  121% 5.97  114% 5.80  111% 
TTF* 5.22  100% 5.23  100% 5.24  100% 
DE, FR, IT** 5.10  98% 5.06  97% 5.08  97% 
Coefficient of 
variation, % 
BG 12.44  68% 28.69  158% 12.39  67% 
EE 19.44  107% 13.29  73% 17.18  93% 
LT 21.44  118% 15.96  88% 18.92  103% 
LV 14.76  81% 14.91  82% 13.49  73% 
PL 19.91  109% 17.20  95% 18.53  101% 
TTF* 18.24  100% 18.11  100% 18.42  100% 
DE, FR, IT** 17.16  94% 16.60  92% 16.89  92% 
Notes: * TTF is taken to be a demand weighted-average wholesale prices in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany; 
** demand weighted-average wholesale prices in Germany, France and Italy 
Comparing the realised prices under the monopoly case (Scenario B1) with marginal cost 
of supply in MS5 reveals a substantially larger mark-up, especially for the Baltic countries 
(relative to TTF) because the cost of gas supply from Russia to these countries are much lower 
than to NWE (Table A. 9, SI Note 4). Further, under Scenario B2, average prices for the three 
Baltic markets fall below the competitive level (Scenario A) because they become a transit hub 
for cheaper gas coming from Russia as part of swap flows (Table 3, §4.3Error! Reference 
source not found.). The striking differences between using TTF as a competitive benchmark 
and the actual cost of supply have far-reaching consequences for European gas market design 
and in particular the role of efficient transmission services pricing to avoid so-called tariff 
pancaking (Chyong, 2019).  
Lastly, it is interesting to note that prices in MS5 (except for BG) are more volatile 
(expressed as coefficient of variation, CV, in Table 1) under perfectly competitive markets than 
under a monopoly scenario which confirms with the theoretical prediction of cost-pass through 
under perfect and imperfect competition with constant marginal cost (e.g., Ritz, 2019). 
 
4.2. Impact of changing delivery points on Gazprom’s dominant position in 
Central and Eastern European gas markets 
Under Gazprom’s commitments, CEE buyers can change gas delivery locations (SI Note 
A.3.4) for a fee paid to Gazprom. Thus, Gazprom’s proposal to offer buyers from CEE the 
possibility of changing the delivery points of their contracted gas with Gazprom means that 
Gazprom can facilitate integration of markets not directly linked by gas transport infrastructure. 
For example, Gazprom might have a long-term supply contract to deliver gas to a wholesaler 
in Slovakia. This wholesaler in turn, as per Gazprom’s commitments, can divert part (or all) of 
its contracted volume to another market – e.g., Bulgaria – by paying a fee to Gazprom. 
We refer to the change of delivery points for Russian gas as ‘swap deals’ because, taking 
the example of Slovakia, if the wholesaler finds it profitable to deliver some (or all) of its 
contracted gas with Gazprom away from Slovakia to allegedly captive markets in the Baltic 
States (e.g. Lithuania) or Bulgaria, then the wholesaler would have to procure alternative gas 
to deliver to its own market in Slovakia; the wholesaler can do so by procuring gas in liquid 
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hubs, e.g. TTF, NCG, etc. Alternatively, if the wholesaler has interruptible contracts with its 
clients further downstream, then it could simply call them in. 
Thus, these swap deals could help ‘equalize’ Russian gas contract prices in CEE markets 
(for a fee paid to Gazprom, and in theory, any differences in prices between MS would then 
equal these service charges – see §3.1). By allowing a change of delivery points, Gazprom 
enables competition between the different contracts it has with clients in these markets. Hence, 
by design and in theory, the possibility of changing delivery points addresses DG COMP’s 
concern of unfair pricing policy by Gazprom (§3.1). That is, the commitment removes any 
price discrimination that Gazprom could have created by charging different prices for the same 
gas, according to customers’ willingness to pay (WTP) in different member states. For 
example, Gazprom could, in theory, price its gas to Poland up to the Polish WTP to secure gas 
supplies (e.g., up to the levelised cost of the Świnoujście LNG terminal and LNG import price). 
Results from modelling monopolistic behaviour with these swap deals (Scenario B2) 
suggest that the commitments can substantially mitigate the potential market power arising 
from Gazprom’s dominant position in MS5. Comparing wholesale prices between Scenarios 
B1 and B2 reveals that for Bulgaria prices reduced by 53% (i.e., by a factor of two) while for 
Poland and the three Baltic markets by ca. 20%. One can see that prices in MS5 under Scenario 
B2 is now very close to prices under the competitive benchmark (ca. 10% difference) (Scenario 
A) (Table 1) suggesting that swap deals can substantially mitigate Gazprom’s hypothetical 
exercise of market power. 
While the impact of swap deals on market prices in MS5 is clear, swap deals will also 
impact prices in other markets, particularly markets west of Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. As 
noted, once Russian gas to Slovakia and Hungary is re-directed to other markets in the Baltics 
and Bulgaria, more gas should flow from the West to Slovakia and Hungary as a substitute for 
the volumes of Russian gas being redirected away. In terms of wider geographic impact, we 
find that in 64% of the sample period (~1410 days) TTF price increases by 0.5-8.0% when 
swap deals are allowed (Scenario B2) relative to the competitive benchmark case (Scenario A) 
(Figure 2) while the TTF price did not change on 26% of the days and interestingly for 9% of 




Figure 2: Changes in TTF gas prices in Scenario B2 relative to competitive benchmark case (Scenario A) 
In summary, the swap deals and corresponding service fees may improve market 
efficiency and market integration between CEE and NWE markets and constrain Gazprom’s 
potential market power in MS5. While swap deals improve market efficiency in CEE by 
limiting Gazprom’s strategic behaviour, they do not improve total social welfare (i.e., total 
welfare of all modelled markets) (Table A.4). By acting strategically, Gazprom reduces 
supplies to CEE (Scenario B1), and, while swap deals increase supplies in CEE (Scenario B2) 
close to the competitive benchmark level (Scenario A), they do so by ‘pulling’ additional, more 
expensive, LNG into Europe (Table 2). 
Table 2: LNG marginal supply cost to Europe and total LNG imports into Europe for scenarios A and B2 
 
LNG marginal supply cost to 
Europe ($/mmBtu) 














Minimum 2.310 2.332 62.5 62.5 
Average* 3.306 3.310 269.8 274.2 
Maximum 4.336 4.362 469.2 483.7 
Coefficient of 
variation 21.6% 21.8% 38.4% 37.6% 
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4.3. Impact of changing delivery points on gas diversification policies and 
infrastructure 
In terms of actual volumes of gas swaps, Table 3 reports total for the modelling period 
(2021-26) and annual average swap volumes between different locations under scenario B2. 
 
Table 3: Physical volume of swaps (bcm) between different locations in Central and Eastern European markets (results 
under Scenario B2) 
From/export BG BG EE HU LT LV SK SK SK SK 
Total 
To/import HU SK PL BG PL PL BG EE LT LV 
Annual average swap volume 0.09  0.27  0.50  0.32  0.47  0.45  0.36  0.69  1.36  1.16  5.66 
As % of total 2% 5% 9% 6% 8% 8% 6% 12% 24% 20% 100% 
As % of annual consumption 
in importing country 
1% 5% 2% 10% 2% 2% 11% 121% 49% 68%  
 
First, the majority of swaps are from Slovakia to the three Baltic markets; then, gas is re-
exported from these three markets to Poland through GILP (EE->PL: 9% of all swap flows; 
LT->PL: 8%; LV->PL: 8%). This suggests that the Baltic markets may become an important 
transit hub for Russian gas imports. Further, in case Gazprom exercises its market power, 
swap deals allow re-optimisation of Russian gas between Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia to 
mitigate any strategic behaviour by Gazprom. Interestingly, Bulgaria may also become a 
trading hub as we see trade and counter-trade between Hungary and Bulgaria but also swaps 
from Bulgaria to Slovakia. 
While swap deals help to mitigate market power, they only improve ‘contractual’ 
diversification for Bulgaria in the sense that Gazprom’s market share in Bulgaria would be 
reduced in favour of re-directed contract gas volumes between Gazprom and buyers in CEE. 
Further, Gazprom’s market share in Lithuania is only marginally reduced to 60% while swap 
volumes increase their share of annual consumption to 39% (Table A. 12), whereas LNG 
volumes are negligible (ca. 2%). Thus, physical gas coming from Russia is almost 99% of 
annual consumption (60% from Gazprom and 39% from swap deals). Similarly, Gazprom’s 
share in the Polish market is roughly constant at 31%, but swap volumes from the Baltics make 
up around 7% of annual consumption at the expense of LNG supplies so physical gas coming 
from Russia could be as high as 38%, or 7% higher than the market share of Russian gas 
without swap deals. 
To summarise, the swap deals seem to increase the market position of Russian gas. The 
swap deals may increase the diversity of contracted gas and increase the number of market 
players further downstream, but they do not improve physical security and diversity of 
supply. They could improve the economics of gas trading and potentially liquidity in CEE 
gas markets but offer little in terms of physical energy security. 
Most investments in gas infrastructure (planned or realised) in MS5 are meant to 
diversify their gas supply portfolios as well as give them an economic advantage in 
negotiations with dominant gas suppliers over terms of gas imports and trade.4 The 
 
4 Lithuania’s Klaipeda LNG terminal is a well-cited example of the role of an alternative source of gas in 
negotiations over terms of trade with Gazprom (e.g., Schulte and Weiser, 2019). 
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subsequent sections focus on the impacts of swap flows on key strategic gas diversification 
infrastructure. 
  
4.3.1. Impact on Gas Interconnector Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) and on LNG terminals 
Our analysis of the competitive benchmark case (Scenario A) confirms the importance of 
the GIPL interconnector as a strategic asset whose value increases if Gazprom decides to 
exercise market power in Poland and the Baltic markets (Scenario B1). In this situation, flows 
through GIPL help to arbitrage away any price differentials arising from potential price 
discrimination by Gazprom (Table 4). Nevertheless, the utilization of this interconnector, as a 
bidirectional trade asset, is expected to be rather low when Gazprom behaves strategically due 
to both Poland and Lithuania having direct access to global LNG; thus, there is already an 
indirect link between these two markets via global LNG markets. The modelling results 
indicate the interconnector is mainly used to transport Russian gas from Lithuania to Poland 
(Scenario A and B2). Under the Gazprom market power scenario (B1), flows from Lithuania 
to Poland drop significantly, while the flow in the opposite direction (PL->LT) increases. This 
suggests that GIPL has strategic value for Lithuania because it limits the potential increase in 
gas prices by increasing flows from Poland to Lithuania.  
Table 4: Average annual flows through GIPL under various scenarios, bcm (% of capacity) 






PL->LT  0.01 (0.4%)  0.52 (21.6%)  0.00 (0%) 
LT->PL  1.43 (75.3%)  0.16 (8.4%)  1.45  (76.1%) 
Notes: average annual flows are for the entire modelling period: 2021-26 
 
Similar to GILP helping to integrate the Baltic markets and acting as an additional 
competitive pressure on Gazprom’s supplies in the region, the LNG terminals in Poland and 
Lithuania are also of strategic importance to the two countries and the region as a whole. Thus, 
when Gazprom exercises market power (Table 5) the utilization of the two LNG terminals 
increases, bringing additional volumes of competitively priced LNG to limit Gazprom’s 
strategic behaviour. Even when the swap deals are permitted this does not seem to affect LNG 
imports into Poland and Lithuania suggesting that the LNG terminals do indeed have strategic 
value to counterbalance potential market power from Gazprom.  
 







(Scenario B2)  
Klaipeda Świnoujście Klaipeda  Świnoujście Klaipeda Świnoujście 
Annual average 
imports, bcm 
 1.29   6.18   1.51   7.53   1.48   7.52  
As % of LNG 
import capacity 
76% 75% 89% 92% 87% 92% 
Notes: average annual flows are for the entire modelling period: 2021-26 
 
 15 
4.3.2. Impact on Greece-Bulgaria interconnector (IGB) 
The IGB pipeline is another strategic project aiming at diversifying gas supplies by 
bringing non-Russian gas (from Azerbaijan) to Bulgaria. Similar to the role of other strategic 
gas infrastructure in the Baltic states, the IGB and access to non-Russian gas from the Caspian 
region are requirements to limit any potential abuse of Gazprom’s dominant position in 
Bulgaria. Our modelling shows that if IGB is implemented and gas from Shah Deniz II is priced 
at short-run marginal cost (SRMC), then IGB could significantly limit Gazprom’s potential 
market power in Bulgaria. Table 6 reports prices in 2021-25 when IGB is not yet operational 
and prices in 2026 when fully operational. One can see that IGB does substantially limit 
potential price increase due to Gazprom’s strategic behaviour: average prices (over 2021-25) 
in BG is $15.73/mmBtu compared to $5.61/mmBtu when IGB is operational (2026). When 
swaps are permitted (Scenario B2), we see increased flow from IGB to Bulgaria (Table 6: 3 
bcm, or 100% of the import capacity) – this suggests that Caspian gas is more competitive than 
Gazprom’s gas in SEE and additional flow from the Caspian region is used to phase out 
Gazprom’s gas in the region which in turn is redirected to Hungary and Slovakia (Table 3: BG-
>HU/SK). 
 











Prices (2021-25) without IGB 6.80          15.73  6.77 
Prices (2026) with IGB 5.61            5.61  5.56 
IGB import in 2026 0.88            0.94  3.00 
Notes: * Demand-weighted average prices; The IGB project execution is still in progress since 2011. Therefore, 
we assumed that IGB starts in 2026 at full flow capacity because of works and delays that the project currently 
faces. 
 
4.3.3. The role of regional interconnections in limiting Gazprom’s market power 
In 2009, disputes between Gazprom and Ukraine led to a gas transit disruption that lasted 
almost two weeks cutting off southwestern Europe, which was followed by shorter 
disruptions in 2010 and 2014.  One key lesson that both European and MS officials drew 
from these disruptions was the need to increase compressor capacity to physical reverse 
capability (i.e., bidirectional flow) (Rodríguez-Gómez et al, 2016). In particular, all cross-
border interconnection points must have physical reverse capability.5 Thus, in this section, we 
analyse the role of bidirectional interconnections in the Baltic region in the presence of 
Gazprom’s market power.    
First, we find that when Gazprom exercises market power (Table 7: Scenario B1 vs A) 
imports flows from Russia into Poland are reduced at GIPL (LT) and Kondratki (BY) and 
alternative supplies come from Mallnow and Lasow interconnection points (reverse flow from 
Germany) and from LNG. This implies that reverse flow from Germany may play a central 
 
5 Regulation 2017/1938, article 5. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017R1938&from=EN#d1e1019-1-1 
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role in putting competitive pressure on Gazprom’s supplies in Poland and the Baltics. In fact, 
when Gazprom exercise market power (B1), Poland becomes a transit hub (Table 7: in Scenario 
B1 flows into PL increased by 5.06 bcm relative to Scenario A) transporting gas from Germany 
for the Baltics, replacing reduced flow from Russia there. 
 
Table 7: Average* annual gas flow into the PL transmission system in Scenario A (bcm) and changes in Scenario B1 and 









Świnoujście (LNG) 6.18 1.35 1.34 
Cieszyn (CZ->PL)  0.00 0.18 -0.00 
Drozdowicze (UA->PL)  0.05 -0.02 0.07 
GIPL (LT->PL)  1.43 -1.06 0.01 
Kondratki (BY->PL: Yamal Europe Pipe)  20.58 -0.37 -0.14 
Lasow (DE->PL) 0.01 0.97 -0.01 
Mallnow (DE-> PL: Yamal Europe Pipe)  0.06 4.17 2.59 
Wysokoje(BY->PL)  5.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Ustylug (UA->PL)  0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
PL Domestic Production  2.34 0.00 0.00 
PL Storage  1.83 -0.08 0.13 
Total  37.56 5.06 3.92 
Notes: *average annual flows are for the entire modelling period: 2021-26 
 
Secondly, when gas swaps are allowed (Scenario B2), these swaps change entry flows 
close to the level we see under Scenario A, when most of the competitively-priced Russian gas 
is coming from GIPL (LT) and Kondratki (BY) at the expense of reverse flows from Germany 
(Lasow and Mallnow) (Table 7: Scenario B2 vs A); however, as noted before, swap deals 
should not affect LNG flows. Thus, there are two sources of competitively-priced gas that could 
limit Gazprom’s strategic behaviour in Poland and the Baltics – LNG imports and reverse flow 
from, primarily, Germany. 
The benefits of highly interconnected markets in the Baltic region can be seen in Table 8. 
When Gazprom exercises its market power, Lithuania imports more gas from Poland (via 
GIPL), which transports gas from Germany. This flow (via GIPL) in turn allows Lithuania to 
export gas to Latvia and onward to Estonia. Interestingly, cross-border trade increases between 
Lithuania and Latvia (e.g., via Kiemenai border point) under Gazprom’s market power 
scenario. Thus, the combination of direct access to LNG plus an increasingly interconnected 
Baltic markets can act as a bulwark against any potential efforts by Gazprom to withhold 
supplies as it seeks to maximise its revenue. Access to LNG markets via Świnoujście (PL) and 
Klaipeda (LT) import terminals is a critical part of this effort to enhance regional gas security 
of supply but is insufficient without greater interconnection.   
Lastly, swap flows (Scenario B2 vs A) limit Gazprom’s market power because entry flows 
in Lithuania and Latvia are close to the levels observed under perfect competition (scenario A). 
That said, this situation is only possible when Poland is connected to Lithuania via GIPL (Table 
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7: Scenario B2 vs A), which allows gas from Germany to be brought into the Baltics when 
Gazprom behaves strategically. 
 
Table 8: Average* annual gas flow into the LT and LV transmission system in Scenario A (bcm) and changes in Scenario 







(Scenario B1-A)  
Delta  




Klaipeda (LNG)  1.29  0.23  0.20  
Kiemenai (LV->LT)  1.23  0.49  0.05  
Kotlovka (BY->LT)  3.89  -1.65  -0.27  
GIPL (PL->LT)  0.01  0.42  -0.01  




Kiemenai (LT->LV)  0.57  0.62  -0.02  
Korneti (RU->LV)  0.59  -0.00  0.11  
LV Storage  0.66  -0.00  -0.05  
Total into LV 1.81  0.61  0.04  
Notes: *average annual flows are for the entire modelling period: 2021-26 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
European LTCs have been restructured since the early 2000s to remove restrictive 
destination clauses since they no longer retained their economic rationale in mature wholesale 
gas markets. There is evidence that these clauses led to higher-than-competitive prices in 
Europe in the last decade, and in Asian markets, where they continue to be part of many 
contracts. The move against these clauses in Gazprom’s LTCs was an important step in the 
two-decade-long EU energy market integration process. Even though Gazprom’s prices in its 
LTCs with Germany had shown convergence with TTF hub prices, and previous DG COMP 
investigations into LTCs with major exporters left out pricing mechanisms as a concern, the 
EC chose to pursue this line of investigation, drawing a hostile initial reaction from Gazprom. 
Gazprom’s market share in many CEE countries has been considerably larger than in NWE 
markets and in some, like Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, Gazprom had operated as 
a virtual monopoly. Our modelling results indicate that Gazprom’s profit under the market 
power assumption is larger than its profit under the competitive benchmark, suggesting it 
would be profitable for Gazprom to limit supplies to MS5. This finding is robust against 
modelled variations in global market scenarios. Therefore, it is understandable that the EC 
sought to reduce Gazprom’s market power in CEE markets and its capacity to charge higher 
oil-indexed prices, by introducing hub-indexation in LTCs and increased market integration 
through ‘swap deals’. The results of our modelling support the EC’s conclusion that ‘swap 
deals’ facilitate further market integration in CEE, while limiting Gazprom’s potential market 
power there. However, this interpretation may ultimately prove counterproductive in terms of 
outcomes and not lessen physical dependence on Russian gas nor improve total welfare since 
“the devil is in the details”. 
We did find that Gazprom’s commitments and the possibilities for CEE customers to 
change delivery points to new locations (in Poland, Baltics and Bulgaria) can substantially limit 
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Gazprom’s potential market power in these markets. This would facilitate regional price 
convergence and offer a rather efficient way to connect these markets to more liquid NWE 
markets. The option of having swap deals enables potential market entry by other suppliers 
into the Baltic markets and Bulgaria and may (positively) affect price negotiations between 
CEE buyers and Gazprom.  
In practice, for these swaps to materialise, there may be a need to request gas release 
programmes further downstream in CEE markets if gas importers are tied to long-term 
purchase agreements with existing suppliers. Further, the minimum volume specified under a 
swap agreement should be small enough to allow small CEE suppliers to enter captive markets 
without undue financial obligations. 
While swap deals improve market efficiency in CEE by limiting Gazprom’s strategic 
behaviour they do not improve total social welfare – by acting strategically, Gazprom reduces 
supplies to CEE, and, while swap deals increases those supplies in CEE close to the level of 
competitive benchmark, they do so by ‘pulling’ additional, more expensive, LNG into Europe. 
This results in overall loss in welfare for the whole of Europe. Thus, political solidarity between 
NWE and CEE has an economic cost. 
Although the ability to change delivery points may have a positive impact on market 
efficiency in CEE, it also poses several policy challenges, namely, gas diversification and 
energy security for MS5. The swap deals may decrease Gazprom’s market share at the expense 
of its other buyers entering the markets of the MS5. But this is ‘contractual’ diversification 
rather than physical diversification, as desired by some CEE countries (e.g., Poland and 
Lithuania), because swap volumes are still Russian gas. 
Indeed, most investments in gas infrastructure (planned or realised) in MS5 are meant to 
diversify their gas supply portfolios as well as give them an economic advantage in negotiations 
with dominant gas suppliers over terms of gas imports and trade. Our modelling results confirm 
the importance of LNG import terminals (e.g., Klaipeda and Świnoujście) and supply 
diversification pipelines (e.g., IGB bringing Azeri gas to Bulgaria). They serve as a hedge 
against Gazprom’s strategic behaviour – when Gazprom exercises market power, our 
modelling shows increased utilisation of these gas infrastructure projects. Further, we show 
swap deals do not substantially affect project utilisation when Gazprom acts strategically. 
Since the 2009 Ukraine gas transit disruption, European authorities and MS regulators 
have been working to prevent a repeat of these disruptions by ensuring all cross-border 
interconnection points have physical reverse capability. Our modelling underscores the 
importance of having such capability: reverse flow from Germany may be effective in putting 
competitive pressure on Gazprom’s supplies into Poland and the Baltics. Should Gazprom 
exercise market power, Poland becomes a transit hub, transporting gas from Germany to the 
Baltics. Further, bi-directional flow capability enhances cross-border gas trade in the Baltic 
region. Thus, in addition to having direct access to LNG, which has been the paramount gas 
diversification goal of many CEE and Baltic states, more interconnected markets become 
critical in case Gazprom acts strategically by withholding supplies to increase its revenue.  
The flipside of this conclusion is that LNG and interconnection in the Baltics increase 
regional gas security of supply in case of gas flow disruption from Russia. Thus, access to 
LNG markets via Polish and Lithuanian import terminals is necessary but not sufficient to 
counterbalance Gazprom’s strategic behaviour; the region also needs to become more 
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interconnected with bidirectional flow capability. In practice, this means that national 
regulatory authorities should ensure non-discriminatory access to gas infrastructure not just 
by their national gas suppliers but for all suppliers (e.g., suppliers in Latvia should be able to 
book capacity in a Polish LNG terminal but also book capacity to bring that LNG back home 
via LT/GIPL or indeed German suppliers having non-discriminatory access to reverse 
capacity to bring gas into Poland and further up north to the Baltics as needed).  
Further, well-interconnected markets in CEE and the Baltic region is important not just 
for security of supply but because they ensure that any proposed swap deals are utilised in the 
most efficient way – this is because swap deals allows gas flows in Europe to be re-optimised 
in response to Gazprom’s strategic behaviour and thus well interconnected markets allows for 
this flow optimisation. This is evident from our modelling where swap deals allowed trade 
and counter-trade between various markets in CEE, Baltics and NWE. 
While our modelling shows that in the next five years swap deals could have a marginally 
negative impact on utilization of CEE strategic assets, there is a risk that, once Gazprom’s 
commitments expire in mid-2026, utilization of these strategic assets will fall considerably, 
especially if Gazprom withholds supplies to CEE and the Baltics. This may have ‘unintended’ 
consequences in terms of disintegrating CEE and Baltic markets from the rest of Europe. For 
example, GIPL interconnector’s utilization rate falls dramatically should Gazprom withhold 
supplies to the region; absent swap deals, the utilisation will not improve. This potentially 
means an increase in the cost of using the CEE gas system because the European regulatory 
model adopted socialises all gas assets are and gas tariffs might not be cost reflective (Chyong, 
2019). The cost of cross-border trading between these small markets and the rest of Europe 
would then be hampered by these additional costs. 
Thus, the only unambiguously positive outcome from the commitments is the certainty 
that Russian gas prices will become more competitive once priced against competitive NWE 
benchmarks, and the socialised cost of gas systems (which would include all strategic assets 
deployed against Gazprom’s monopoly power). It is a vicious circle in the sense that these 
projects were publicly financed on security grounds in the expectation they would be used 
should Gazprom exercise its market power. Gazprom committing for a short period (until mid-
2026) to change its practices to ensure competitive markets and prices means these assets will 
not be utilised or will be utilised much less than envisaged, but costs still need be allocated to 
all users of their gas systems beyond the commitment period. 
More generally, considering declining gas demand relative to the size of the gas systems 
and the widely divergent competitive landscape across European markets, our results reveal 
fundamental challenges to the project of completing a single European market for gas in the 
next ten years. Addressing these challenges may require further gas market reforms, 
particularly, the current market design for gas transportation: potential policy options range 
from retaining the existing entry-exit regime to more drastic reforms such as redefining market 
zones and gradually moving to nodal pricing.  
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Market power and long-term gas contracts: the case of Gazprom in 
Central and Eastern European Gas Markets 
 
Chi Kong Chyong, David M Reiner and Dhruvak Aggarwal*** 
 
NOTE 1: CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL GAS TRADE 
LTCs have undergone considerable structural changes as EU gas markets have liberalised 
since the 1990s. Technological innovation and lower LNG transportation costs have provided 
a more flexible alternative to pipeline gas, diminishing the incentive for buyers to enter into 
long-term agreements, and opening up opportunities for diversification, arbitrage and new 
contract designs (Jensen 2004; Neumann and von Hirschhausen, 2004; von Hirschhausen and 
Neumann, 2008; Neumann et al., 2015) particularly in price formation (§0) and supply (e.g., 
destination) flexibility (§0). The EC’s Sector Inquiry into energy markets between 2005 and 
2007 concluded that pre-liberalisation era LTCs with traditional clauses were barriers to 
competition in wholesale gas markets (Wäktare et al., 2007). The number of active LTCs in 
Europe reduced from 31 before 1990 to 18 between 2015 and 2018, while the share of total gas 
consumption tied to LTCs shrunk from 32 % to 12%, and the average contract duration fell 
from 23 years to 14 years (Chyong, 2019). 
The presence of LTCs and specific clauses in traditional contracts in the natural gas 
industry have been explained and studied using transaction cost economics theory (Joskow, 
1991; Spanjer, 2009a). Given the capital-intensive and asset-specific nature of gas production 
and supply, LTCs offer a form of vertical integration to protect buyers and sellers against 
regulatory risks, distribute investment risk and ensure fixed-cost recovery (Klein et al., 1978; 
Williamson, 1979; Mulherin 1986). By creating long-term dependencies between buyers and 
sellers, LTCs protect parties against ex post strategic bargaining and hold-up. They may specify 
the quality and quantity of gas to be delivered, unit prices, buyer and seller liabilities, and 
review clauses to address market uncertainties over a specified time horizon. Specific LTC 
clauses can have long-term ramifications for national energy security and expenditures. 
Understandably, contract design and its impact on competitiveness of the gas market continues 
to attract scrutiny from major importing and exporting nations. 
 
A.1.1. Price formation 
Pricing represents one of the most important components of LTCs. Wholesale gas price 
formation has traditionally been done by indexing against crude oil derivatives to protect 
buyers from prices higher than those of substitutes (Serletis and Herbert, 1999; Brown and 
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Yucel, 2008; Hartley et al, 2008). The shift toward pricing based on ‘gas-on-gas’ (GOG) 
competition has been fuelled by the substitutability of oil and gas in the European power 
generation sector disappearing and structural reforms of power and gas markets in Europe. The 
process started in the UK in early to mid-1990s (Heather, 2010), but only began in earnest in 
Continental Europe in the mid-2000s. By contrast, North American prices have been 
competitively determined by the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) at the Henry Hub 
(HH) since 1990 (Mazighi, 2005).  Further, rising oil prices since 2008 caused higher oil-linked 
gas prices in European contracts to diverge significantly from spot prices (Figure A. 1). In 
2012, prices of gas purchased under oil-indexation in Europe were four to six times trading-
hub prices in North America.  
 
 
Figure A. 1: Historical wholesale gas prices under various price formation mechanisms 
Source: Bloomberg and Thomson Eikon Terminals. 
Note: TTF DA (Day Ahead): The Title Transfer Facility: a virtual trading point for natural gas in the Netherlands; RU avg. 
LTC: an average actual monthly price of Russian LTC gas sold at the German border as reported by the Ministry of Economic 
Development of Russian Federation. Since October 2016, the Russian Government has stopped updating this price. The 
historic oil-indexed price is calibrated using historic BAFA (average gas import) prices at the German border over a period 
when all gas coming into Germany was oil-indexed (pre-2008). 
 
Figure A. 2 shows the share of pricing mechanisms in Europe and NWE based on the 
International Gas Union’s classification of pricing mechanisms. The share of GOG pricing in 
Europe increased from 15% in 2005 to almost 76% in 2018, and OPE’s share reduced from 
78% to about 24%. The nearly 20% jump in GOG pricing in Europe between 2005 and 2010 
was caused by a wave of renegotiations between European importers and exporters to introduce 
spot-indexation components into LTCs, particularly in the UK and Netherlands (IGU, 2012). 
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2010 (Franza, 2014). A number of large importers including RWE, Uniper, DONG and Engie 
used available contract clauses to renegotiate LTC prices with Gazprom (Henderson and 
Sharples, 2018). Another 20% jump in GOG pricing is observed between 2012 and 2015, the 
years when DG COMP launched the investigation on Gazprom and issued the SO, respectively. 
The impact of this trend is evident when looking at reported historical Russian average gas 
prices in Germany and the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) day-ahead (DA) wholesale price 
(Figure A. 1) – by 2015, Russian gas price had converged to TTF DA prices. TTF in the 
Netherlands serves as the dominant trading hub for Continental Europe, and the National 
Balancing Point (NBP) for the UK, with developed futures markets and low bid-ask spreads 
(for details on liquidity, price risk hedge etc., see Heather 2019; De Menezes et al., 2019). By 
early 2018, two-thirds of all European contracts with Gazprom offered hub-linked or hybrid 
pricing (Henderson and Sharples, 2018). 
 
 
Figure A. 2: Share of OPE and GOG in wholesale pricing mechanisms in total gas consumption 
Source: International Gas Union, Wholesale Gas Price Surveys 2011-2019. 
Note: OPE: Oil-Price Escalation - price of gas is linked to competing fuels like crude oil or gas oil, through a base price and 
an escalation component; GOG: Gas-On-Gas – prices are either formed based on supply and demand and trades at physical 
hubs or are based on these competitive indices. It also includes LNG spot cargoes linked to hub prices. Mechanisms other than 
OPE and GOG also exist, for example bilateral monopoly prices, regulated prices etc.; the sum of all these mechanisms add 
up to 100% of the imported gas; 2007 and 2010 shares for NWE are approximate values as numbers for these years were not 
reported.  
 
The mere presence of a hub does not ensure competitive wholesale prices. Structural 
characteristics of markets like physical interconnection to more liquid hubs, market 
concentration, diversity of supply, liquidity, and demand and supply fundamentals also have a 
strong bearing on the competitiveness of trades and thus, on wholesale prices. For example, 
back in 2013 when many European markets were structurally uncompetitive (Figure A. 3) we 
saw a clear positive correlation between market concentration and average wholesale prices in 
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the more liquid German and Czech hubs due to trade-limiting security of supply regulations 
and strong incumbents (ACER, 2017) despite shifting from regulated to GOG pricing in the 
same year (IGU, 2019).  
 
Figure A. 3: Gas wholesale prices in EU MSs compared with market concentration and gas demand in 2013 
Source: ACER Market Monitoring Report 2014 
Note: Circle sizes indicate gas demand; orange circles denote MS with liquid markets.  
 
A.1.2. Competitive supply and flexibility  
Traditional LTC design imposes rigidities in supply diversification as buyers and sellers 
seek to share volume and price risks and appropriable quasi-rents before making highly specific 
investments (Parsons, 1989; ESMAP, 1993; Rüster, 2009). These traditional LTC features 
were especially important for immature gas markets that would enable project developers to 
finance the entire gas value chain – from ‘wellhead to the burner tip’ (Crocker and Masten, 
1996). Hence, traditional LTCs restricted delivery of contract volumes to particular ports or 
interconnector points, through the so-called “destination clauses”6. Destination clauses allow 
sellers to restrict deliveries to designated locations, limiting the buyers’ capacity to divert gas 
supplies for commercial reasons (arbitrage through reselling) or operational reasons (lack of 
storage capacity or demand). These clauses can also place restrictions on re-sale of gas 
purchased from the seller to other geographical markets.  
Apart from destination restrictions, Take-or-Pay (ToP) clauses in LTCs oblige buyers to 
purchase a fixed minimum volume of gas from the seller, regardless of actual instantaneous 
requirements, and they bind the seller to supply the designated volumes (Creti and Villeneuve, 
2004). This is in part why early storage facilities were constructed by buyers. In markets which 
have limited liquidity of the physical commodity and derivative products, like Asian markets, 
these clauses offer one means to distribute volume risk between buyers and sellers (Masten and 
Crocker, 1985). However, in mature gas markets like in North American and NWE, ToP 
clauses can limit the buyer’s ability to procure gas on the spot market or from other sellers, 
 
6 ‘Destination clauses’ are also called ‘territorial restrictions’ as they limit the delivery and use of supplied gas 
to a single market separated along geographical boundaries or end-use industries (Talus 2011). We use the two 
terms interchangeably.  
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which in turn limits diversification of supply and market entry of new suppliers, thereby 
inducing foreclosure. 
To include some flexibility in supply, traditional LTCs included profit-sharing 
mechanisms (PSMs). PSMs oblige buyers to share profits made on re-sale of gas with the 
original seller. These clauses have been deemed anti-competitive as disclosure of the re-sale 
destination and contract for calculating re-sale profits may reveal competitively sensitive 
information, and the ratio of profit sharing can potentially diminish incentives for the buyer to 
resell gas to another market, effectively acting as destination clauses. PSMs have been part of 
traditional LTCs for LNG gas imports. Globally, major gas importers have sought to phase out 
destination clauses and PSMs from LTCs. In Europe, since the early 2000s the EC has 
employed its powers to push for deep changes in traditional LTCs (Neuhoff and von 
Hirschhausen, 2005), particularly in clauses concerning destination restrictions or territorial re-
sale (Chyong, 2019). 
 
A.1.3. Price review clauses and welfare 
LTCs are inherently incomplete since all future market states and contingencies cannot be 
foreseen and defined within contracts, what Williamson (1975) terms ‘bounded rationality’. 
Due to their long durations, inflexibility and incompleteness, LTCs can impose enforcement 
and adjudication costs, particularly when market fundamentals start to diverge from the time 
when they were concluded (Crocker and Masten, 1988). Goldberg (1982) explained that price 
revision clauses, which use market prices as an index, allow pricing of product redefinitions 
over the contract duration, efficient coordination between parties through accurate price 
signals, and limit pre-agreement search and post-agreement jockeying. Hence, while oil-
indexation may protect buyers in immature markets where oil and gas prices are cointegrated, 
when these prices get decoupled the absence of GOG pricing can cause welfare losses through 
inefficient pricing, and imposition of costs in arbitration or court-mandated revisions.  
Figure A. 4 shows an estimate of the gross welfare loss7 in EU MS caused by oil-indexation 
of gas prices in mature European markets, which is estimated by comparing border prices in 
national markets with the Dutch price based on the TTF index.8  
 
7 Welfare loss for eight CEE MS for year n = ∑ (total import volumes of each CEE MS in year n x import prices 
declared at border in year n) – (total import volumes of each CEE MS in year n x TTF prices in year n)  
8 ACER, an EU agency responsible for integration and completion of European Internal Energy Market for 
electricity and gas, uses similar comparison in its gas market monitoring reports to convey the potential losses to 
welfare of gas price divergence between European gas markets 
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Figure A. 4: Welfare losses in EU Member States due to wholesale gas price divergence 
Source: ACER Market Monitoring Reports 2012-2017; Comext database; Authors’ calculations  
 
From stable levels in 2012 and 2013 there was a steep fall in welfare losses between 
2013 and 2014 with gas demand falling due to economic strain and competition from 
renewables (Franza, 2014), but also due to increasing price convergence between regional 
European markets and the TTF price index. Convergence of wholesale prices is attributable 
to increasing market integration and competition with the implementation of Network Codes 
introduced under the Third Energy Package (see ACER Market Monitoring Reports 2012-
2017), and the renegotiation of traditional LTCs to include components of spot indexation. In 
the eight CEE countries involved in the 2012 Gazprom investigation, welfare losses in the 
first full year following the initiation of proceedings fell sharply as a number of LTCs were 
renegotiated to include hub-indexation. From 2014 through 2016, overall welfare losses 
continued to decline, although welfare losses in the Eight CEE have been relatively stable, 
and most of the fall was in the rest of the EU. From 2016 to 2017, losses did not reduce as 
much as in previous years due to increased price divergence between: 1) NBP and other 
European hubs, and 2) the two zones of the French market, both due to capacity congestion 
(ACER, 2017). The UK and French markets had the largest share of gross welfare losses in 
2017 because of their higher import volumes compared to smaller CEE MS. Notably, in 2012 
and 2017 the Eight CEE MS cumulatively imported 9.7%% and 10.6% of EU-27+UK gas 
imports respectively, but their share of total welfare losses only fell from 32% to 21%. Of the 
€3.45 billion in total EU welfare losses, €0.71 billion accrued to these CEE countries in 2017, 
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NOTE 2: DG COMP’S INVESTIGATIONS INTO EUROPEAN GAS 
MARKETS 
A.2.1. An overview of antitrust and cartel cases European in gas markets 
DG COMP’s antitrust enforcement have been geared toward integrating regional European 
markets, as this is seen to increase competition in national markets, increase welfare through 
competitive pricing, promote security of supply and provide the EU with a strategic advantage 
in the global gas market. A concerted effort toward this objective began in 2005 with the EC’s 
Sector Inquiry into competition in gas and electricity markets (EC, 2016). The Inquiry 
concluded with a call for stronger enforcement of antitrust laws and adoption of the Third 
Energy Package, which created the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
and includes three competition-related regulations on: 
• Unbundling of transportation and transmission services from production, 
• Greater cross-border integration through empowered national regulators, and,  
• Non-EU ownership of transmission systems.  
A number of antitrust and merger investigations were triggered by the Inquiry. Market 
sharing agreements between the German supplier E.ON and the French supplier GdF were 
investigated for collusion in 2006, under which the suppliers agreed not to make sales in each 
other’s markets. DG COMP stated that their market sharing agreement had inhibited 
competition in both markets, and each supplier was fined €553 million. In 2007, contracts of 
the Belgian supplier Distrigas with downstream users were investigated and subsequently 
found to be causing foreclosure by locking users into their contract volumes. In its proposed 
remedies, which were accepted by the DG COMP after a market test, Distrigas committed to 
making 70% of supplied volumes available to competitors annually.  
Mergers of major suppliers were also prohibited on grounds of market concentration and 
potential foreclosure, such as the joint takeover of Portugal’s incumbent gas company GDP by 
the incumbent electricity company EDP and ENI (EC, 2016). Other potential mergers were 
abandoned due to failure to reach settlements, like the acquisition of the Hungarian oil and gas 
company MOL by the Austrian oil and gas group OMV. In total, between 1994 and 2014, DG 
COMP investigated 351 cases in gas and electricity markets, 38 of which were antitrust 
investigations, the rest being merger control cases (EC, 2016). 23 of these 38 pertained to gas 
markets, and 22 of these involved LTCs. These cases, along with the two initiated after 2014, 
are summarised in Table A. 1. 
 
A.2.2. EC Investigations into LTCs 
The EC has employed antitrust enforcement and regulations, state aid and merger control, 
as well as its ex-officio investigative powers to liberalise European gas markets. DG COMP 
opened investigations into contractual restrictions in gas markets as early as 1998. 
Commitments to remove restrictive clauses that may have segmented regional EU gas markets 
were obtained from major exporters, as well as from national sellers of gas. The first settlement 
came in 2000 when Gas Natural Fenosa (now Naturgy) agreed to amend its supply contracts 
with the incumbent Spanish electricity generator Endesa, allowing the latter to use gas for 
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purposes other than electricity generation, thereby ending market segmentation. Subsequently, 
commitments were secured from other major European national suppliers to allow third party 
access to transmission networks to facilitate competition; from Germany’s Thyssengas in 2001 
and BEB in 2003, Dutch Gasunie in 2003 and French GdF in 2004.  
The landmark decision in investigations into import-related LTCs came in 2002 when 
Nigeria’s NLNG agreed to remove territorial restrictions from its LTCs, which was followed 
by the restructuring of Gazprom’s contracts with ENI in 2003, and with OMV and Ruhrgas in 
2005 to remove similar restrictions (Wäktare, 2007). Investigations into LTCs with the 
Algerian national supplier Sonatrach, also initiated in 2001, took longer to settle due to the 
EC’s insistence that its investigation was limited to compliance of structural (clauses apart from 
pricing) aspects with EU competition law, while the inclusion of PSMs, on which Algeria 
insisted, was a bilateral pricing concern of the buyer and seller (Wäktare, 2007). Notably, the 
NLNG investigation was settled in 2002 with a clarification from NLNG that LTCs did not 
include PSMs (EC, 2002).  
An analysis by Spanjer (2009b) of the EC’s stance in the Distrigas case of 2007 (see Table 
A. 1) found that the case reflected regulatory opportunism at the expense of Distrigas. 
Analysing the EC’s previously stated positions in LTC-related competition cases, Spanjer 
found that while the EC acknowledged that LTCs can prevent contracting parties from 
exploiting regulatory loopholes and opportunism, it did not acknowledge the cost of frequent 
regulatory interventions as a consequence of reformed LTCs, and therefore, may be going too 
far to achieve competitive contractual terms.  
 
A.2.3. The 2012 Gazprom investigation  
 In its 2012 Gazprom investigation, the EC emphasised the anticompetitive nature of oil-
indexed pricing mechanisms in LTCs, relating it to Gazprom’s dominant market position in 
the eight MS. Previous investigations had objected to structural aspects of pipeline gas and 
LNG contracts, but the pricing mechanism and frequency of price-review had been left for 
bilateral negotiations between Gazprom and importers. Responding to the September 2012 
announcement initiating the proceedings, Gazprom claimed it was an attempt by the EC to 
“influence prices and result of commercial negotiations”, and the following week the Russian 
government passed an executive order № 1285 obliging “strategic” Russian companies to seek 
government consent before disclosing information to foreign authorities (President of Russia, 
2012).  
Further, the EC’s objection to Gazprom’s refusal to change delivery points of pipeline gas 
did not have a precedent, as earlier investigations into pipeline gas contracts with Sonatrach 
had only concerned territorial clauses restricting use and re-sale of gas, even though Sonatrach 
supplied pipeline gas to European markets via connectors to Spain as well as Italy. It could be 
argued that if Sonatrach were to allow similar swaps between the two markets it could lead to 
closer integration of South European markets.  
The prevailing opinion within the EC at the time was that, given the mutual 
interdependence of the EU and Russia on a stable buyer-seller relationship and in view of the 
potentially larger role for Gazprom in a liberalised European market, it would be in Gazprom’s 
interest to accept the EC concessions and settle for a ‘commitments decision’ (Sartori 2013). 
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Failure to reach a settlement could result in a formal EC ‘prohibition’ investigation, potentially 
proceeding to the Court of Justice of the EU and snowballing into an expensive and prolonged 
geopolitical stand-off (Riley, 2012). Gazprom would lose its major buyer and the EU would 
have to look for alternative exporters – more than 115 bcm were tied through LTCs until 2020 
and about 65 bcm through 2030, compared to EU’s 2013 imports of 153 bcm (Dickel et al., 
2014). In February 2017, Gazprom proposed commitments pursuant to Article 9 of the Council 
Regulation 1/2003 to address the EC’s objections, without any admission of competition law 
infringement9. Gazprom proposed committing to: 
1) Remove all clauses that would hinder re-sale of its gas to other customers once and 
for all, and facilitate cross-border gas trade in CEE gas markets by allowing 
Gazprom’s customers in those countries to change delivery points; 
2) Introduce competitive gas price benchmarks10 into price review clauses contained 
in its long-term gas sales contracts with MS5 customers, and increase the frequency 
and speed of price revisions; and finally, 
3) Not claim damages from Bulgaria for cancellation of the South Stream pipeline.  
In March 2017, the EC opened Gazprom’s proposed commitments to a market test, 
inviting stakeholder comments on the proposal. Most parties whose comments were made 
public seemed to have had a positive opinion of the proposed ‘commitments decision’, with 
the notable exception of Poland. The state-owned Polish supplier PGNiG expressed grave 
concerns that Gazprom’s proposal did not ensure an end to its strategy of market segmentation 
in CEE and argued for a formal infringement decision under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 
EC (PGNiG, 2018). The Industry, Trade, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee of the 
European Parliament, headed at the time by the Polish MEP Jerzy Buzek, expressed 
disappointment in the EC’s decision not to impose fines on Gazprom to compensate the victims 
of its anticompetitive strategy in CEE (Stern and Yafimava, 2017a).  
Lithuania took a softer stance, proposing an alternative mechanism for pricing from that 
proposed by Gazprom and reiterating that the proposal lacked compensation for damages 
incurred, but fell short of calling for a ‘prohibition decision’ (Sytas, 2017). Bulgaria saw the 
proposal in a more positive light but sought clarifications on certain aspects, such as the exact 
benchmarks to be used in future price reviews (Tsolova, 2017), which were subsequently added 
to Gazprom’s revised commitments (Gazprom, 2017). The Latvian position was also positive 
(Collins, 2016), while the Hungarian and Czech governments concluded new contracts with 
Gazprom shortly after the proposals were made, without making public comments on the 
commitments themselves (Stern and Yafimava, 2017b), implying a positive stance.  
Ultimately, following the market test and some minor changes, the revised commitments 
proposed by Gazprom in March 2018 were made legally binding on Gazprom in a 
‘commitments decision’ passed on 24 May 2018 (EC, 2018).
 
9 Article 9 allows for prospective resolution of competition problems in markets, without either a formal 
admission of guilt or a finding of infringement, whereas Article 7 leads to a formal prohibition case of 
infringement with the possibility of significant fines (Dunne 2014). 
10 Average weighted import border prices in Germany, France and Italy and/or the development of the prices at 
the relevant generally accepted liquid hubs in Continental Europe (paragraph 19(1) in Gazprom’s commitments, 
Case AT 39816: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/g2/gazprom_commitments.pdf) 
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Table A. 1: Antitrust and cartel cases investigated by the DG COMP in gas markets 




Policy area: Particulars Settlement Details (Year of settlement) 
1999 COMP/E-
4/36.559 
EdF Trading (UK) / 
WINGAS (Germany)  
Antitrust: Contract clauses allowing WINGAS to reduce 
volumes bought from EdF if EdF sells gas to WINGAS’s 
competitors in Germany, reducing EdF’s incentive to 
directly supply to customers in Germany 
Removal of reduction clauses from existing 
contracts between EdF and WINGAS, 




Endesa / GasNatural 
(Spain) 
Antitrust: Clauses in GasNatural’s contract preventing 
Endesa from using gas for purposes other than electricity 
generation, foreclosure in gas market due to long-term 
contract between GasNatural and Endesa 
Removal of use-restriction clauses, reduction 
of duration of GasNatural’s supply contracts 
and volumes bought by Endesa (2000) 
2000 COMP/E-
3/36.246 
Marathon (Norway) / 
Thyssengas (Germany), 
Gasunie (Netherlands), 
BEB (Germany), GdF 
(France) 
Antitrust: Refusal of Thyssengas, Gasunie, BEB, GdF 
GmbH to grant network access to third parties 
Commitments by Thyssengas (2001), 
Gasunie (2003), BEB (2003), GdF (2004) to 
effectively allow third parties access to its 
pipeline network  
2000 COMP/E-
4/37.732 
ESB (Ireland), Statoil 
(Norway) joint venture 
Synergen 
Antitrust: Construction of 400MW gas fired plant in 
Ireland by incumbent ESB and potential new entrant Statoil 
Commitments by incumbent ESB to conduct 
auctions until new independent producers 
enter the market (2002) 
2001 COMP/E-
3/37.708 
EU / Enterprise Oil, Statoil, 
Marathon (Norway) 
Cartel: Application by Norwegian companies to jointly 
market the gas produced at Corrib oilfield 




UK / Belgian 
interconnector 
Antitrust: Rigidities in responsiveness of the Zeebrugge 
interconnector to respond to supply and demand, and flows 
against price differentials   
Conclusion of new contracts between 
shippers provisioning for swifter flow 




EU / Gas Negotiating 
Committee (GFU) 
(Norway)  
Antitrust: Fixing of gas prices and quantities through joint 
sale under the Gas Negotiating Committee (GFU)  
Discontinuation of joint marketing and sales, 
commitment by Norwegian sellers to make 




DUC / DONG (Denmark) Antitrust: Joint marketing activities by DUC partners 
Shell, Maersk and ChevronTexaco, and reduction and use-
restriction clauses in supply contracts with DONG 
Removal of reduction and use-restriction 
clauses in contracts and commitment by 
companies to sell gas independently (2003) 
2001 COMP/E-
3/37.811 
ENI (Italy) / Gazprom 
(Russia)   
Antitrust: Territorial restrictions in contracts between ENI 
and Gazprom  
Removal of territorial restrictions from ENI 
and Gazprom contracts (2003) 
2001 COMP/38
.085 
OMV (Austria) / Gazprom 
(Russia) 
Antitrust: Territorial restrictions on re-sale of gas 
purchased from Gazprom by OMV, right of first refusal to 
OMV on Gazprom’s available gas  
Removal of territorial restrictions and right of 




E.ON Ruhrgas (Germany) / 
Gazprom (Russia)  
Antitrust: Territorial sales restrictions in contracts between 
Ruhrgas and Gazprom 
Removal of territorial restrictions from 
Ruhrgas and Gazprom contracts (2005) 
2001 COMP/37
.811 
European importers / 
Sonatrach (Algeria)   
Antitrust: Territorial restrictions in existing supply 
contracts between Sonatrach and EU importers, and 
inclusion of profit-sharing mechanisms in new contracts 
Removal of territorial restrictions Sonatrach 
and EU import contracts, agreement to add 




European importers / 
NLNG (Nigeria)  
Antitrust: Territorial restrictions and profit-sharing 
mechanisms in LNG import contracts between NLNG and 
EU importers 
Removal of territorial restrictions and profit-
sharing mechanisms from NLNG and EU 
import contracts (2002) 
2004 COMP/38
.662 
ENI, ENEL / GdF (France) Antitrust: Prevention of re-sale of gas by ENI and ENEL 
transported by GdF using contract clauses 
Removal of re-sale restriction clauses (2004) 
2006 COMP/39
.401 
E.ON (Germany), GdF 
(France) 
Cartel: Market-sharing agreement to not sell gas in each 
other’s markets, long-term capacity reservation  





consumers / Distrigas 
(Belgium)  
Antitrust: Long term contracts between Distrigas and 
downstream industrial consumers causing foreclosure in 
downstream markets 
Commitment by Distrigas to make 70% of 
supplied gas to be open to new competitors, 
contract duration limited to 5 years (2008) 
2007 COMP/39
.402 
EU / RWE (Germany)  Antitrust: Abuse of market position by RWE in gas 
transport and wholesale supply by increasing new entrants’ 
costs and preventing access 
Divestiture by RWE from existing 
transmission network (2009) 
2007 COMP/39
.315 
EU / ENI (Italy) Antitrust: Capacity hoarding, capacity degradation and 
strategic underinvestment by ENI in gas transport 
infrastructure 
Divestiture by ENI in companies related to 




EU / GdF Suez (France) Antitrust: GdF causing foreclosure in French gas markets 
through long-term reservation of import capacity and 
underinvestment  




EU / E.ON (Germany) Antitrust: E.ON causing foreclosure in German gas 
markets through long-term reservation of import capacity 
and underinvestment 




EU / Gazprom (Russia)  Antitrust: Territorial restrictions in LTCs between 
Gazprom and CEE countries 
Commitments by Gazprom to remove 
territorial restrictions in contracts (2018) 
2013 COMP/39
.849 
EU / Bulgarian Energy 
Holding (Bulgaria) 
Antitrust: Refusal of BEH to grant third party access to its 
gas transmission network, storage facilities and import 
pipelines 
€77 million fine imposed on BEH (2018) 
2017 COMP/40
.335 
EU / Transgaz (Romania) Antitrust: Restriction of imports to EU through Romanian 
interconnector by Transgaz using fees, underinvestment and 
delaying exports 
Investigation on-going; market test opened in 
September 2018; proposed commitments to 
increase export capacity and use non-
discriminatory tariffs 
2018 AT.40416 EU / Qatar Petroleum 
(Qatar)  
Antitrust: Territorial restrictions in LNG supply contracts 
between Qatar Petroleum and European importers 
Investigation on-going (as of mid-2019) 
 
Source: EC Competition case search, data extracted on 27 June 2019; EC Reports on Competition Policy 2000-2017; DG COMP Press Releases 
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NOTE 3: MAIN DATA INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR 
MODELLING 
A.3.1. The Gas Market Model - Formulation 
The global gas market model used in this analysis is a static, deterministic, perfect foresight 
optimization model formulated as a nonlinear programming problem (NLP). A detailed 
formulation of the model using mixed complementarity framework (MCP) can be found in 
Chyong and Hobbs (2014). The model, formulated as a MCP, was originally developed to 
analyse the economics of large-scale gas pipeline projects (e.g., Nord Stream and South 
Stream) and their impacts on the evolution of the European gas market, energy policy and 
geopolitics. A version of this model was then used by the UK’s Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) to model GB’s gas security of supply to 2035 (CEPA, 
2017) the results of which informed BEIS’s strategic policy review in this area (BEIS, 2017).  
Here, we outline the formulation of our gas market model using a NLP formulation. Let us 




2. Since demand equal 
supplies at every demand nodes (i.e., 𝑑𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑗 ), we can write a general social welfare 
maximization problem as follows: 
max
𝑠𝑗𝑖≥0




















− ∑ [∑ 𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑖
𝑖







𝑠𝑗𝑖 ≤ 𝑇𝑗𝑖               (𝜆𝑗𝑖) (A2) 
∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑖
𝑖
≤ 𝑄𝑗        (𝛾𝑗) 
(A3) 
where 𝑠𝑗𝑖 is gas supply from j to i, Cj(·) is total production cost and 𝑡𝑗𝑖 is transport cost; we 
assume constant marginal cost of production at i or 𝐶𝑖
′(∙) = 𝑐𝑖; Tij is upper transport capacity 
limit while Qj is upper production capacity;  
One can see that except for the middle square bracketed term, the objective function (eq. 
1) of this non-linear maximization problem is similar to the standard ‘social welfare’ 
maximization problem used to calculate perfectly competitive equilibria in spatial commodity 
markets (Samuelson 1952; Harker, 1986; Labys and Yang, 1991) and, specifically, natural 
gas markets (e.g., Boucher and Smeers, 1985; Beltramo et al., 1986; Boucher and Smeers, 
1987; Boots et al., 2004; Kiss et al., 2016). For example, the term in the first square bracket is 
gross consumer surplus generated at all consumption nodes i by consuming 𝑑𝑖 while the term 
in the last square bracket is total supply cost of all producing nodes j; The middle term allows 
transformation of the standard perfect competition condition ‘price equals marginal cost’ to 
‘marginal revenue equal marginal cost’. In the latter case, the marginal revenue is for any 
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Cournot producer j that we assume behave strategically; removing this middle term turns the 
problem into a welfare maximization under perfect competition11. 
 
A.3.2. Key Modelling Assumptions 
The distinctive feature of this global model is the ability to analyse the interaction of supply 
and demand at daily resolution and at global scale. On the supply side, the model includes all 
the main gas producing countries, such as Russia, Norway, Qatar, Australia, Algeria and 
other producing regions such as North America, Central and South America, Middle East, 
Central Asia and so on. On the demand side, the model covers all existing consuming 
countries and regions, such as Great Britain, Continental European markets, Russia and other 
countries of the Former Soviet Union, China, India, North America, Middle East and so on. 
Further, the model considers all existing cross-border interconnection points in Europe as 
well as disaggregating European demand regions into individual national markets (for all of 
the EU-27+UK). 
To match demand with supply, the model also covers the key stages of the gas value 
chain: from production regions down to the transmission level. It captures various gas 
infrastructure assets: pipelines, LNG and gas storage facilities. It is an economic and 
optimization model and therefore does not include some real-world characteristics of gas 
infrastructure (such as pressure drop in gas pipelines, management of linepack, gas quality 
limits etc.). 
Given the assumptions about costs and capacities for these infrastructure assets, the 
objective of the model is to find a least cost solution to meet global demand taking into 
account various physical constraints, such as gas production capacities, transmission network 
capacities, LNG liquefaction and regasification/send-out capacities, storage injection, 
withdrawal and maximum working volume capacities as well as minimum and maximum 
daily demand profiles and contractual obligations (e.g. annual contract quantity and minimum 
take-or-pay). The outputs from the model are projections of supply, demand, equilibrium 
prices, pipeline and LNG flows, storage injection and withdrawal at daily resolution. 
This analysis was calibrated to 2020 and 2021 using gas demand and supply capacities 
from IEA (2020b) WEO 2020 and from IEA’s most recent (2020) short-term gas market 
report (see details below). Marginal supply cost curves are taken from the MIT (2011) report 
on the future of natural gas12. All other assumptions related to physical capacities of existing 
infrastructure assets were obtained from IEA WEO 2020, or from the owners of those 
infrastructure assets. 
It is important also to note that the entry and exit charges that were used for the 
European network in the model are annual tariffs (taken from ACER reports), hence flow 
patterns from the model should be treated as annual contracted flows adjusted for daily 
fluctuations in supply and demand conditions, whereas in reality there are different 
transportation products (e.g. daily, monthly) with corresponding tariff structures which may 
(or may not) result in additional flows for some entry and exit points in Europe. 
 
11 This formulation is applicable if we have affine demand functions (Hashimoto 1985). 
12 MIT (2011). “The Future of natural gas: An interdisciplinary MIT study,” MIT multidisciplinary report 
(published online 6 June 2011). http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_Report.pdf. 
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Also, it is worth mentioning that the European pipeline network in the model does not 
take into account the differences between high- and low-calorific gas and therefore some of 
the physical constraints resulting from such differences might not be captured in the network 
flow results. However, it is understood that conversion facilities between high and low-
calorific gas are in place at the majority of the interconnection points of the two systems (e.g. 
in the Netherlands13) so these differences would have a limited impact on the flows from the 
model. 
Finally, daily gas demand profiles14 are the average of daily gas demand in the last 5 
years and hence the impact of weather on gas demand in the modelling time horizon (2021-
2026) is assumed to be an average impact witnessed in that 5-year period. 
 
A.3.3. Global Supply and Demand Balance Modelled 
Our central case demand projections to 2026 includes estimated negative impacts of 
covid-19, which is based on IEA (2020a) short-term gas market analysis. In particular, post-
covid demand projection for 2026 for all key regional gas market is based on the following 
set of assumptions: 
1. IEA (2020a) expects covid-19 will have a permanent negative impact on global 
demand of 75 bcm in 2025 relative to pre-covid demand but without detailing this 
impact by regions; 
2. However, IEA (2020a) expects most of this permanent reduction in demand to be in 
the developed countries; hence, to allocate this demand reduction to our modelled 
regions, we assume that this reduction is proportion to the reduction in 2020 (relative 
to 2019), which IEA (2020a) did publish (see Figure A. 5). 
Thus, Table A. 2 below summarises our reference demand projections for key regional 
gas markets under our central case (IEA short-term demand forecast) and two sensitivities: 
IEA SPS and SDS scenarios from 2020 World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2020b). One can see 
that these scenarios cover a wide range of potential demand variations by 2025. 
 
13 See https://www.gasterra.nl/en/news/from-l-gas-to-h-gas 
14 Most of data needed to estimated demand profiles for EU countries were obtained from 




Figure A. 5: Demand reduction in 2020 relative to 2019 
Source: IEA (2020a) 
 










Asia Pacific 891 858 844 
China    437    401    376 
India    91    94    99 
Central and South America 164 167 151 
Eurasia 536 536 520 
Europe 527 512 461 
EU27    401    391    354 
Middle East 655 613 545 
North America 1116 1126 986 
Source: IEA (2020a; 2020b) 
 
A.3.4. Delivery points for “gas swaps” and service fee 
In Gazprom’s proposed commitments (2017) there was a limited set of original gas 
delivery points from which wholesalers could ask Gazprom to change gas flows. 
Subsequently after the market test feedback, in its Final Commitments Gazprom (2018) has 
expanded on the number of delivery points eligible for swap flows; it also revised the 
minimum service fees and other revisions. Thus, the following delivery points available for 
European wholesalers to change gas flows: 
1. Estonia: Varska delivery point located at the Estonian/Russian border 
2. Latvia: Izborsk delivery point located at the Estonian/Russian border 
3. Lithuania: Kotlovka delivery point located at the Lithuanian/Belarussian border 
4. Poland: Kondratki and Wysokoje delivery points located at the Polish/Belarussian 
border 
5. Slovakia: Velke Kapusany delivery point located at the Slovak/Ukrainian border 





























7. Bulgaria: Negru Voda delivery point located at the Bulgarian/Romanian border 
 
Table A.3 outlines the committed service fees charged by Gazprom for changing the 
delivery points for the wholesalers. Note that in the final commitments, Gazprom offered that 
the flows between the original and new delivery points could be on bidirectional basis, unlike 
in the proposed commitments where swap flows was only on unidirectional basis. 
 
Table A.3: Service fee for swaps flows between original and new delivery points 
Original point New delivery point Service fee 
€/MWh $/tcm 
Kondratki (PL) Kotlovka (LT) 0.76 10.3989 
Kondratki (PL) Varska (EE) 0.76 10.3989 
Kondratki (PL) Izborsk (EE/LV) 0.76 10.3989 
Wysokoje (PL) Kotlovka (LT) 0.76 10.3989 
Wysokoje (PL) Varska (EE) 0.76 10.3989 
Wysokoje (PL) Izborsk (EE/LV) 0.76 10.3989 
Velke Kapusany (SK) Kotlovka (LT) 1.52 20.7979 
Velke Kapusany (SK) Varska (EE) 1.52 20.7979 
Velke Kapusany (SK) Izborsk (EE/LV) 1.52 20.7979 
Beregovo (HU) Negru Voda (BG) 1.52 20.7979 
Velke Kapusany (SK) Negru voda (BG) 1.52 20.7979 
Notes: EUR to USD exchange rate was based on the average spot rate on the 9th of Feb-21 
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NOTE 4: DETAILED RESULTS FROM THE MODEL 
A.4.1. Social welfare, Gazprom profit and wholesale prices under alternative 
market scenarios 
 
Table A.4: Simulated social welfare for all markets under various scenarios, $ bn (%, relative to Scenario A)  
 
 STO case   SPS case   SDS case  
Scenario A 20,634 (100%) 21,706 (100.0%) 16,675 (100.0%) 
Scenario B1 20,594 (99.8%) 21,661 (99.8%) 16,642 (99.8%) 
Scenario B2 20,595 (99.8%) 21,663 (99.8%) 16,643 (99.8%) 
 
Table A.5: Gazprom’s simulated profit ($ bn) under various scenarios 




















2021 43.59 42.18 42.02 42.23 41.27 40.86  28.90   31.19   30.49  
2022 38.04 38.97 38.42 37.31 38.28 37.65  23.17   25.07   24.27  
2023 33.04 34.80 34.19 33.03 34.50 33.62  20.44   22.09   21.52  
2024 29.92 31.44 30.61 29.09 30.99 30.04  18.49   19.93   19.41  
2025 26.60 28.31 27.62 24.83 27.01 26.30  14.89   16.39   16.03  
2026 25.86 26.87 26.88 24.74 26.01 26.04  10.73   11.63   11.67  
 
Table A.6: Simulated wholesale gas prices in $/mmbtu (% TTF) under IEA’s SPS scenario 




behaviour in MS5 




BG  7.82  187% 16.14  385%  7.79  186% 
EE  3.65  87%  5.45  130%  4.08  98% 
LT  3.75  90%  4.90  117%  4.22  101% 
LV  3.43  82%  4.87  116%  3.86  92% 
PL  4.11  99%  4.99  119%  4.79  115% 
TTF*  4.17  100%  4.19  100%  4.18  100% 
DE, FR, IT**  4.06  97%  4.06  97%  4.05  97% 
Minimum price 
($/mmbtu) 
BG  7.20  269%  7.20  268%  7.20  269% 
EE  2.82  106%  3.70  138%  2.60  97% 
LT  2.86  107%  3.04  113%  2.63  98% 
LV  2.74  102%  3.12  116%  2.36  88% 
PL  2.95  110%  3.06  114%  2.98  111% 
TTF*  2.67  100%  2.69  100%  2.68  100% 
DE, FR, IT**  2.73  102%  2.74  102%  2.74  102% 
Maximum price 
($/mmbtu) 
BG  8.65  167% 19.55  378%  8.65  167% 
EE  4.81  93%  6.21  120%  5.12  99% 
LT  6.74  130%  7.58  147%  5.61  108% 
LV  4.23  82%  5.63  109%  4.54  88% 
PL  6.26  121%  5.91  114%  5.74  111% 
TTF*  5.17  100%  5.17  100%  5.19  100% 
DE, FR, IT**  5.04  98%  5.00  97%  5.03  97% 




EE 19.05  107% 12.04  68% 16.92  94% 
LT 21.00  118% 15.25  86% 18.60  104% 
LV 14.76  83% 13.51  76% 13.26  74% 
PL 19.30  108% 16.62  94% 18.20  101% 
TTF* 17.79  100% 17.68  100% 17.96  100% 
DE, FR, IT** 16.72  94% 16.15  91% 16.47  92% 
Notes: * TTF is taken to be a demand weighted-average wholesale prices in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and 
Germany; ** demand weighted-average wholesale prices in Germany, France and Italy 
 
Table A. 7: Simulated wholesale gas prices in $/mmbtu (% TTF) under IEA’s SDS scenario 




behaviour in MS5 




BG  5.51  155% 10.61  293%  5.22  145% 
EE  3.31  93%  4.77  132%  3.73  103% 
LT  3.36  94%  4.20  116%  3.77  104% 
LV  3.17  89%  4.19  116%  3.58  99% 
PL  3.60  101%  4.33  120%  4.20  116% 
TTF*  3.56  100%  3.62  100%  3.61  100% 
DE, FR, IT**  3.45  97%  3.47  96%  3.46  96% 
Minimum price 
($/mmbtu) 
BG  3.02  160%  3.02  151%  3.02  154% 
EE  2.82  150%  3.14  157%  2.00  102% 
LT  2.48  132%  2.48  124%  2.04  104% 
LV  2.56  136%  2.56  128%  1.92  98% 
PL  2.39  127%  2.52  126%  2.46  126% 
TTF*  1.88  100%  2.00  100%  1.95  100% 
DE, FR, IT**  1.98  105%  2.03  101%  2.03  104% 
Maximum price 
($/mmbtu) 
BG  8.42  185% 15.64  337%  8.42  181% 
EE  4.30  94%  5.44  117%  4.84  104% 
LT  6.40  140%  6.58  142%  4.94  106% 
LV  3.72  82%  4.86  105%  4.26  92% 
PL  5.74  126%  5.36  115%  5.29  114% 
TTF*  4.56  100%  4.65  100%  4.64  100% 
DE, FR, IT**  4.33  95%  4.37  94%  4.37  94% 
Coefficient of 
variation, % 
BG 26.61  147% 39.11  220% 24.46  138% 
EE 14.41  80% 13.52  76% 16.42  93% 
LT 16.15  89% 17.09  96% 17.64  100% 
LV 12.74  71% 15.45  87% 15.32  86% 
PL 16.30  90% 18.85  106% 18.83  106% 
TTF* 18.05  100% 17.78  100% 17.72  100% 
DE, FR, IT** 15.55  86% 15.41  87% 15.35  87% 
Notes: * TTF is taken to be a demand weighted-average wholesale prices in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and 
Germany; ** demand weighted-average wholesale prices in Germany, France and Italy 
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A.4.2. Results from comparing prices under Scenario B1 with average NWE prices 
under the competitive benchmark case (Scenario A) 
 
Figure A. 6: Frequency of simulated price mark-ups for the five CEE MS under market power case (Scenario B1) relative to 
average prices of North Western European (NWE) markets in 2021-26 under the competitive benchmark case (Scenario A) 
Note: The x-axis shows the relative price index under market power compared to the average NWE prices under a competitive 
benchmark (competitive benchmark = 1). The y-axis shows the total number of days that prices under market power are higher 
(>1) or lower (<1) than under the competitive benchmark case. For example, in Bulgaria, there are 328 days over the period 
2021-26 when prices under market power exceed competitive NWE prices by a factor of 4. 
 
Table A. 8: Relative price index under market power case (Scenario B1) (relative to calculated TTF price). 
 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 
BG 
Jan 3.946 3.941 4.423 4.665 4.852 1.896 
Feb 3.392 3.415 3.597 3.786 3.835 1.524 
Mar 3.384 3.381 3.562 3.732 3.731 1.447 
Apr 3.372 3.271 3.36 3.409 3.309 1.312 
May 3.334 3.145 3.233 3.189 3.154 1.256 
Jun 3.316 3.113 3.062 3.144 3.132 1.327 
Jul 3.799 4.07 3.764 4.014 3.883 1.629 
Aug 4.003 4.189 4.123 4.289 4.033 1.71 
Sep 4.077 4.169 4.383 4.525 4.127 1.757 
Oct 4.176 4.454 4.491 4.688 4.251 1.798 
Nov 4.309 4.744 4.829 4.924 4.482 1.947 
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EE 
Jan 1.352 1.329 1.387 1.4 1.431 1.448 
Feb 1.229 1.266 1.266 1.268 1.26 1.325 
Mar 1.226 1.253 1.253 1.254 1.234 1.28 
Apr 1.226 1.253 1.252 1.252 1.233 1.276 
May 1.225 1.252 1.251 1.251 1.23 1.273 
Jun 1.244 1.273 1.283 1.293 1.287 1.358 
Jul 1.471 1.442 1.443 1.481 1.485 1.467 
Aug 1.426 1.453 1.456 1.494 1.494 1.374 
Sep 1.378 1.454 1.456 1.494 1.495 1.294 
Oct 1.377 1.454 1.456 1.494 1.496 1.231 
Nov 1.378 1.454 1.461 1.494 1.495 1.281 
Dec 1.376 1.452 1.455 1.494 1.495 1.307 
LT 
Jan 1.203 1.184 1.224 1.233 1.259 1.269 
Feb 1.101 1.16 1.156 1.161 1.165 1.207 
Mar 1.15 1.169 1.163 1.163 1.164 1.183 
Apr 1.103 1.141 1.136 1.143 1.143 1.173 
May 1.098 1.14 1.133 1.14 1.141 1.169 
Jun 1.114 1.149 1.153 1.163 1.167 1.207 
Jul 1.317 1.264 1.257 1.28 1.281 1.259 
Aug 1.262 1.267 1.26 1.28 1.283 1.156 
Sep 1.213 1.267 1.261 1.28 1.284 1.074 
Oct 1.213 1.267 1.26 1.28 1.284 1.011 
Nov 1.214 1.267 1.264 1.28 1.284 1.051 
Dec 1.214 1.266 1.259 1.28 1.284 1.086 
LV 
Jan 1.22 1.198 1.239 1.245 1.265 1.277 
Feb 1.116 1.152 1.146 1.142 1.126 1.184 
Mar 1.113 1.141 1.134 1.129 1.103 1.144 
Apr 1.113 1.14 1.134 1.128 1.102 1.14 
May 1.112 1.14 1.132 1.126 1.1 1.138 
Jun 1.13 1.156 1.16 1.162 1.149 1.21 
Jul 1.336 1.285 1.279 1.305 1.305 1.284 
Aug 1.283 1.289 1.283 1.308 1.308 1.182 
Sep 1.234 1.29 1.284 1.309 1.309 1.1 
Oct 1.234 1.289 1.283 1.309 1.31 1.037 
Nov 1.234 1.289 1.288 1.308 1.309 1.078 
Dec 1.233 1.288 1.282 1.308 1.309 1.113 
PL 
Jan 1.171 1.172 1.211 1.22 1.247 1.255 
Feb 1.161 1.165 1.167 1.177 1.188 1.218 
Mar 1.166 1.165 1.159 1.168 1.17 1.201 
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Apr 1.165 1.164 1.158 1.166 1.169 1.2 
May 1.165 1.163 1.157 1.165 1.167 1.196 
Jun 1.158 1.156 1.161 1.173 1.18 1.217 
Jul 1.204 1.235 1.238 1.256 1.252 1.235 
Aug 1.183 1.236 1.228 1.246 1.249 1.181 
Sep 1.182 1.236 1.229 1.246 1.25 1.106 
Oct 1.181 1.236 1.228 1.246 1.25 1.044 
Nov 1.182 1.236 1.232 1.246 1.25 1.084 
Dec 1.181 1.235 1.227 1.246 1.25 1.12 
Notes: price indices were calculated by dividing the projected prices of the corresponding MS5 by the by calculated TTF 
prices; these indices show by how much prices in MS5 differ from TTF prices over time. 
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A.4.3. Results from comparing prices under Scenario B1 with marginal cost of 
supply in MS5 (Scenario A) 
 
Figure A. 7: Frequency of simulated price mark-ups for the MS5 under market power case (Scenario B1) relative to their 
marginal cost of supply in 2021-26. 
Note: x-axis shows the relative price index under market power compared to day-ahead average NWE prices under competitive 
benchmark (competitive benchmark = 1). Y-axis shows the total number of days that prices under market power are higher 
(>1) or lower (<1) than marginal cost of supply. 
 
Table A. 9: Relative price index under market power case (Scenario B1) (relative to marginal cost of supply in MS5). 
 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 
BG 
Jan  2.057   2.169   2.300   2.404   2.462   1.000  
Feb  2.226   2.164   2.290   2.436   2.481   1.000  
Mar  2.203   2.204   2.327   2.483   2.506   1.000  
Apr  2.349   2.384   2.422   2.459   2.437   1.000  
May  2.369   2.371   2.408   2.426   2.412   1.000  
Jun  2.327   2.312   2.321   2.363   2.361   1.000  
Jul  2.253   2.223   2.206   2.268   2.272   1.000  
Aug  2.232   2.200   2.222   2.271   2.269   1.000  
Sep  2.242   2.197   2.259   2.302   2.282   1.000  
Oct  2.257   2.238   2.274   2.323   2.300   1.000  
Nov  2.221   2.277   2.315   2.351   2.331   1.000  
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Jan  1.581   1.526   1.588   1.548   1.546   1.558  
Feb  1.431   1.477   1.494   1.450   1.431   1.488  
Mar  1.363   1.428   1.447   1.394   1.360   1.397  
Apr  1.357   1.426   1.443   1.390   1.359   1.389  
May  1.320   1.405   1.423   1.365   1.327   1.364  
Jun  1.415   1.458   1.487   1.443   1.424   1.466  
Jul  1.742   1.697   1.668   1.628   1.626   1.599  
Aug  1.758   1.805   1.727   1.650   1.644   1.465  
Sep  1.703   1.806   1.727   1.650   1.644   1.365  
Oct  1.724   1.806   1.727   1.650   1.644   1.296  
Nov  1.705   1.806   1.727   1.650   1.644   1.295  
Dec  1.669   1.787   1.720   1.649   1.644   1.377  
LT 
Jan  1.393   1.340   1.377   1.348   1.345   1.350  
Feb  1.269   1.333   1.341   1.313   1.309   1.342  
Mar  1.215   1.264   1.262   1.246   1.243   1.253  
Apr  1.178   1.232   1.231   1.226   1.224   1.238  
May  1.135   1.195   1.192   1.199   1.195   1.217  
Jun  1.254   1.287   1.305   1.285   1.279   1.290  
Jul  1.545   1.471   1.437   1.391   1.386   1.356  
Aug  1.539   1.555   1.478   1.397   1.395   1.219  
Sep  1.483   1.556   1.478   1.397   1.395   1.120  
Oct  1.502   1.556   1.478   1.397   1.395   1.051  
Nov  1.486   1.556   1.478   1.397   1.395   1.051  
Dec  1.456   1.540   1.472   1.397   1.395   1.131  
LV 
Jan  1.458   1.449   1.477   1.428   1.397   1.428  
Feb  1.343   1.457   1.486   1.413   1.340   1.391  
Mar  1.331   1.446   1.478   1.403   1.326   1.368  
Apr  1.331   1.446   1.478   1.403   1.326   1.368  
May  1.331   1.446   1.478   1.403   1.326   1.368  
Jun  1.350   1.447   1.478   1.405   1.342   1.374  
Jul  1.618   1.510   1.472   1.434   1.466   1.441  
Aug  1.587   1.544   1.465   1.416   1.473   1.300  
Sep  1.526   1.544   1.465   1.416   1.473   1.197  
Oct  1.526   1.544   1.465   1.416   1.473   1.125  
Nov  1.526   1.544   1.465   1.416   1.473   1.125  
Dec  1.524   1.538   1.464   1.416   1.473   1.208  
PL 
Jan  1.210   1.221   1.248   1.256   1.268   1.270  
Feb  1.181   1.193   1.203   1.223   1.232   1.257  
Mar  1.168   1.177   1.174   1.187   1.186   1.211  
Apr  1.157   1.170   1.169   1.183   1.182   1.204  
May  1.157   1.166   1.165   1.179   1.177   1.200  
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Jun  1.174   1.182   1.197   1.206   1.220   1.234  
Jul  1.214   1.262   1.280   1.280   1.282   1.262  
Aug  1.226   1.274   1.299   1.290   1.288   1.186  
Sep  1.232   1.275   1.301   1.290   1.288   1.104  
Oct  1.233   1.275   1.301   1.290   1.288   1.040  
Nov  1.231   1.275   1.301   1.290   1.288   1.040  
Dec  1.233   1.274   1.299   1.289   1.288   1.117  
Notes: price indices were calculated by dividing the projected prices of the corresponding MS5 by the by calculated marginal 




A.4.4. Results from comparing prices under Scenario B2 with average NWE prices 
under the competitive benchmark case (Scenario A) 
 
 
Figure A. 8: Frequency of simulated price mark-ups for the MS5 under market power with swap deals case (Scenario B2) 
relative to the NWE competitive benchmark case (Scenario A) in 2021-26. 
Note: X-axis shows relative price index under market power compared to prices under competitive benchmark (competitive 
benchmark = 1). Y-axis shows the total number of days that prices under market power are higher (>1) or lower (<1) than 
under the competitive benchmark case. 
 
Table A. 10: Relative price index under market power with swap deals (Scenario B2) (relative to calculated TTF price). 
 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 
BG 
Jan 1.922 1.814 1.936 1.967 1.970 1.896 
Feb 1.525 1.569 1.571 1.562 1.550 1.525 
Mar 1.537 1.527 1.533 1.508 1.489 1.447 
Apr 1.437 1.366 1.389 1.391 1.357 1.314 
May 1.408 1.319 1.342 1.324 1.322 1.258 
Jun 1.425 1.348 1.329 1.341 1.343 1.328 
Jul 1.682 1.855 1.737 1.774 1.710 1.629 
Aug 1.793 1.930 1.902 1.889 1.778 1.706 
Sep 1.818 1.924 1.988 1.965 1.808 1.744 
Oct 1.849 2.018 2.025 2.018 1.849 1.788 
Nov 1.940 2.113 2.133 2.094 1.923 1.945 
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Jan 0.944 0.962 1.007 1.052 1.071 1.082 
Feb 0.935 0.936 0.949 0.968 0.987 1.016 
Mar 0.921 0.935 0.952 0.981 0.992 1.008 
Apr 0.935 0.944 0.963 0.992 1.004 1.019 
May 0.944 0.955 0.974 1.014 1.024 1.033 
Jun 0.946 0.959 0.978 1.001 1.018 1.057 
Jul 0.908 0.977 1.015 1.060 1.067 1.082 
Aug 0.891 0.970 1.029 1.078 1.083 1.057 
Sep 0.888 0.970 1.029 1.079 1.083 0.980 
Oct 0.889 0.970 1.029 1.079 1.084 0.949 
Nov 0.892 0.970 1.030 1.078 1.083 0.931 
Dec 0.903 0.969 1.028 1.078 1.083 1.014 
LT 
Jan 0.958 0.978 1.023 1.062 1.081 1.092 
Feb 0.949 0.949 0.963 0.978 0.996 1.026 
Mar 1.006 1.007 1.025 1.035 1.041 1.055 
Apr 1.008 1.007 1.029 1.038 1.046 1.059 
May 1.035 1.035 1.055 1.069 1.073 1.077 
Jun 0.968 0.980 0.998 1.012 1.028 1.066 
Jul 0.916 0.986 1.025 1.070 1.078 1.093 
Aug 0.900 0.980 1.039 1.089 1.093 1.065 
Sep 0.896 0.980 1.039 1.089 1.094 0.956 
Oct 0.898 0.980 1.039 1.089 1.094 0.950 
Nov 0.900 0.980 1.040 1.089 1.094 0.942 
Dec 0.911 0.979 1.038 1.089 1.094 1.012 
LV 
Jan 0.915 0.935 0.977 1.022 1.031 1.043 
Feb 0.883 0.888 0.888 0.924 0.942 0.976 
Mar 0.836 0.852 0.859 0.893 0.902 0.926 
Apr 0.847 0.856 0.868 0.902 0.911 0.933 
May 0.838 0.850 0.861 0.897 0.905 0.928 
Jun 0.886 0.903 0.912 0.946 0.962 1.009 
Jul 0.913 0.987 1.028 1.043 1.044 1.055 
Aug 0.929 1.002 1.061 1.066 1.059 1.029 
Sep 0.930 1.002 1.061 1.066 1.060 0.947 
Oct 0.929 1.002 1.061 1.066 1.060 0.919 
Nov 0.930 1.002 1.061 1.066 1.059 0.901 
Dec 0.927 1.001 1.059 1.066 1.059 0.985 
PL 
Jan 1.111 1.123 1.133 1.169 1.192 1.195 
Feb 1.130 1.111 1.127 1.137 1.140 1.154 
Mar 1.134 1.119 1.132 1.142 1.141 1.152 
Apr 1.134 1.118 1.132 1.142 1.142 1.153 
May 1.133 1.118 1.131 1.141 1.140 1.155 
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Jun 1.132 1.119 1.134 1.142 1.147 1.165 
Jul 1.161 1.156 1.190 1.199 1.195 1.206 
Aug 1.138 1.110 1.178 1.190 1.195 1.147 
Sep 1.129 1.103 1.177 1.190 1.195 1.000 
Oct 1.126 1.103 1.177 1.190 1.196 0.999 
Nov 1.128 1.103 1.177 1.190 1.195 1.044 
Dec 1.126 1.102 1.176 1.190 1.195 1.057 
Notes: price indices were calculated by dividing the projected prices of the corresponding MS5 by the by calculated TTF 
prices; these indices show by how much prices in MS5 differ from TTF prices over time. 
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A.4.5. Results from comparing prices under Scenario B2 with marginal cost of 




Figure A. 9: Frequency of simulated price mark-ups for the MS5 under market power with swap deals case (Scenario B2) 
relative to their marginal cost of supply in 2021-26. 
Note: X-axis shows the relative price index under market power compared to day-ahead average NWE prices under 
competitive benchmark (competitive benchmark = 1). Y-axis shows the total number of days that prices under market power 
are higher (>1) or lower (<1) than under the competitive benchmark case.  
 
Table A. 11: Relative price index under market power with swap deals case (Scenario B2) (relative to marginal cost of 
supply in MS5). 
 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 
BG 
Jan  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000  
Feb  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000  
Mar  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000  
Apr  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000  
May  0.999   0.998   0.998   1.003   1.011   1.000  
Jun  1.000   1.000   1.001   1.005   1.012   1.000  
Jul  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000  
Aug  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000  
Sep  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000  
Oct  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000  
Nov  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000  
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EE 
Jan  1.095   1.102   1.142   1.145   1.159   1.164  
Feb  1.086   1.096   1.118   1.099   1.116   1.138  
Mar  1.025   1.070   1.098   1.086   1.093   1.100  
Apr  1.035   1.079   1.108   1.096   1.106   1.108  
May  1.017   1.076   1.106   1.102   1.104   1.105  
Jun  1.074   1.097   1.126   1.113   1.125   1.139  
Jul  1.077   1.133   1.152   1.161   1.168   1.178  
Aug  1.098   1.188   1.191   1.191   1.191   1.130  
Sep  1.096   1.189   1.191   1.191   1.191   1.041  
Oct  1.112   1.189   1.191   1.191   1.191   1.005  
Nov  1.102   1.189   1.191   1.191   1.191   0.943  
Dec  1.095   1.176   1.186   1.190   1.191   1.071  
LT 
Jan  1.101   1.104   1.139   1.144   1.157   1.162  
Feb  1.091   1.094   1.114   1.099   1.114   1.137  
Mar  1.065   1.090   1.107   1.102   1.110   1.115  
Apr  1.073   1.088   1.109   1.106   1.116   1.114  
May  1.067   1.088   1.107   1.118   1.122   1.118  
Jun  1.085   1.095   1.121   1.113   1.124   1.138  
Jul  1.075   1.132   1.150   1.159   1.166   1.176  
Aug  1.097   1.186   1.189   1.189   1.189   1.125  
Sep  1.095   1.187   1.189   1.189   1.189   1.004  
Oct  1.111   1.187   1.189   1.189   1.189   0.994  
Nov  1.101   1.187   1.189   1.189   1.189   0.943  
Dec  1.094   1.174   1.184   1.188   1.189   1.057  
LV 
Jan  1.090   1.131   1.157   1.157   1.142   1.167  
Feb  1.061   1.129   1.151   1.137   1.117   1.145  
Mar  0.998   1.084   1.117   1.106   1.084   1.106  
Apr  1.011   1.090   1.130   1.118   1.096   1.117  
May  1.001   1.083   1.122   1.113   1.091   1.114  
Jun  1.058   1.130   1.156   1.141   1.124   1.144  
Jul  1.107   1.146   1.161   1.143   1.171   1.184  
Aug  1.150   1.184   1.181   1.153   1.192   1.134  
Sep  1.150   1.184   1.181   1.153   1.192   1.038  
Oct  1.150   1.184   1.181   1.153   1.192   1.003  
Nov  1.150   1.184   1.181   1.153   1.192   0.941  
Dec  1.147   1.179   1.180   1.153   1.192   1.073  
PL 
sJan  1.147   1.172   1.161   1.188   1.215   1.211  
Feb  1.148   1.145   1.162   1.176   1.179   1.190  
Mar  1.135   1.135   1.145   1.156   1.156   1.161  
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Apr  1.125   1.128   1.141   1.153   1.154   1.156  
May  1.125   1.126   1.137   1.150   1.149   1.157  
Jun  1.148   1.146   1.165   1.172   1.185   1.180  
Jul  1.175   1.166   1.209   1.219   1.223   1.232  
Aug  1.180   1.129   1.215   1.232   1.232   1.154  
Sep  1.176   1.121   1.216   1.232   1.232   1.006  
Oct  1.176   1.121   1.216   1.232   1.232   1.001  
Nov  1.175   1.121   1.216   1.232   1.232   1.002  
Dec  1.176   1.121   1.214   1.231   1.232   1.056  
Notes: price indices were calculated by dividing the projected prices of the corresponding MS5 by the by calculated marginal 







A.4.6. Detailed results of the assessment of the impact of swap deals on MS5 import 
dependency 
Table A. 12: Sources of gas in MS5 under market power scenarios with swaps (Scenario B2) and without swaps (Scenario 
B1) 
BG 
 Scenario B2  Scenario B1 
 Gazprom Net Swaps Other sources  Gazprom Other sources 
2021 73% 23% 4%  96% 4% 
2022 73% 23% 4%  96% 4% 
2023 73% 27% 1%  98% 2% 
2024 73% 27% 0%  99% 1% 
2025 73% 27% 0%  100% 0% 
2026 73% -68% 94%  73% 27% 
LT 
 Scenario B2  Scenario B1 
 Gazprom Net Swaps Other sources  Gazprom Other sources 
2021 59% -2% 44%  60% 40% 
2022 59% 41% 0%  60% 40% 
2023 59% 40% 1%  60% 40% 
2024 59% 39% 1%  60% 40% 
2025 60% 38% 2%  61% 39% 
2026 60% 36% 4%  61% 39% 
PL 
 Scenario B2  Scenario B1 
 Gazprom Net Swaps Other sources  Gazprom Other sources 
2021 31% 12% 57%  31% 69% 
2022 31% 9% 60%  31% 69% 
2023 31% 10% 59%  31% 69% 
2024 31% 3% 66%  31% 69% 
2025 31% 2% 67%  32% 68% 
2026 32% 4% 64%  32% 68% 
EE 
 Scenario B2  Scenario B1 
 Gazprom Net Swaps Other sources  Gazprom Other sources 
2021 65% 34% 1%  67% 33% 
2022 65% 35% 0%  68% 32% 
2023 65% 35% 0%  68% 32% 
2024 66% 34% 0%  68% 32% 
2025 66% 34% 0%  68% 32% 
2026 66% 34% 0%  69% 31% 
LV 
 Scenario B2  Scenario B1 
 Gazprom Net Swaps Other sources  Gazprom Other sources 
2021 57% 39% 5%  59% 41% 
2022 57% 43% 0%  59% 41% 
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2023 57% 43% 0%  59% 41% 
2024 57% 43% 0%  59% 41% 
2025 58% 42% 0%  59% 41% 
2026 58% 41% 1%  60% 40% 
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